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Abstract
This thesis seeks to understand motivations for collective violence beyond the
traditional explanations of ethnic hatred or racism. Often, historical scholarship focuses
on ethnic hatred and racism, and elaborates on the processes by which those notions and
hatreds came to be. Scholarship in the political science realm often gets past the hatred
hypothesis but does not explore historical myths and legacy formation as they contribute
to past and current violence. This thesis employs a case study approach to understand
collective violence that is global and takes multiple cultures and religions into account.
The case studies were chosen thematically, and each case study had personal relevance,
and elucidated concerns of ethical remembrance and memorialization particularly well. It
employs the power/threat and political elite framework as the primary motivator of
collective violence and seeks to explore the historical myths that led to past violence and
how the legacies of those events are causing current conflict.
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Introduction
“Be prepared... the past is coming.”
“Words from a Young Night” by Qassim Haddad
An Explanation of Collective Violence
Collective violence can be broadly defined. It is usually described as violence by
people who identify themselves as members of a group against those of another to
achieve political, economic, or social objectives. As such, the definition of “group”
begins to play a large role in what we define as “collective.” For the purposes of this
analysis, collective violence is largely defined as most group versus group dynamics,
including mob violence and riots, as well as violence by an individual acting on behalf of
a larger group, often framed in ideological terms. This thesis will explore the dominant
pre-existing frameworks that are used to explain collective violence, and case studies to
determine how effective those frameworks are. It will also explore historical memory,
and legacy formation as a result of violence and dominant themes and factors that exist
across different cases of collective violence.
This analysis is primarily based on incidences of violence that would be described
as ethnic or racial violence. While the case studies at play are indeed motivated by ethnic
and racial hatred, this thesis explores alternative explanations for these events. This
thesis, rather than arguing that ethnic and racial violence are not significant motivators
for violence, stems instead from an exploration of the limitations of ethnic/racial hatred

1

models, and their treatment of the “collective.”1 These models often take a bird’s eye
view, allowing the causes for political differences to seem like inevitabilities that stem
from hatred. Ethnic violence is never easy to comprehend, especially when the
perpetrators are civilians and their victims are their neighbors, friends, and community
members. It is this “intimate” violence that this thesis seeks to make thinkable, while
avoiding a default assumption that simplistic notions of hatred motivate collective action.
Ethnic/racial violence exists in many communities, but pogroms, massacres and
genocides occur in a minority of communities. This thesis highlights and explores
specific moments of collective violence as they relate to larger movements that then
create problematic legacies.
The four localities discussed in this analysis, Tulsa, Poland, the Indian
subcontinent, and Rwanda, were all surrounded by communities with similar group
dynamics, and yet violence only broke out in a limited geographic subset. And so,
ethnicity and race can only be one factor amongst many, rather than the primary factor.
Not only is accepting ethnicity and race as primary motivators worrying in that it allows
us to overlook other factors, but it also plays into problematic tropes that political leaders
push as an attempt to veil their failings or mask other political problems as racial and
ethnic divisions. In fact, allowing ethnic or racial divides to serve as the primary
motivation and explanation for violence means that many commentators become
complicit in political projects of governing elites. Another important lens to apply to
questions of collective violence is to view it as a process rather than a moment. This not
only means that it is key to place it in a larger historical context to examine the complex
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Ben Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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dynamics at play, but also to allow actors to move between or occupy multiple categories
at the same time. Viewing actors in a dynamic way allows us to better understand their
role in contexts of violence.2 Actors often move between “perpetrator” and “bystander,”
or “rescuer” and “victim.” Furthermore, actors cannot be easily put into one box or the
other in regard to ethnicity, because this erases the role of elites or the state in generating
these identities to serve a political end. While that end may not be intentional violence, it
could be an attempt to draw convenient lines to carry out state projects, which might
eventually result in violence.
At its core, this analysis seeks to provide a framework by which to consider
intimate collective violence. Collective violence is difficult to understand for many
reasons, including but not limited to the fact that it is difficult to grapple with the idea of
people killing those close to them. Violence often confounds rational explanations.
Civilians do better in times of peace than they do in times of war and so, it does not make
sense for civilians to go along with elite projects, given that civilians stand to gain the
least with the most risk, and elites stand to gain the most with the least risk. Intimate
violence makes it even more difficult to consider given that strong kinship ties should
preclude violence, especially genocide, not facilitate it.

The Rationale Behind the Case Studies
The first case study explores the Tulsa Race Massacre as an example of racial
violence. The chapter introduces how national tropes, such as the myth of the American
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Lee Ann Fuji, Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda (Cornell University Press, 2009),
11.
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Dream, come to play a dominant role in motivating violence and assesses the theory of
power/threat as a means to analyze this historical moment. This chapter will first examine
the riots, and how they began, and Tulsa’s cultural context. The Tulsan context is key
because black people in Tulsa lived with relative freedom and social mobility, especially
as compared to the rest of the South. Black Tulsans not only did relatively well
financially, hence the existence of a “Black Wall Street,” but also were somewhat
politically engaged, and spoke out against the racist injustices of the time, like lynching.
Greenwood, the predominantly black neighborhood in Tulsa, was a largely self-sufficient
community and did not have to rely culturally or economically on Tulsa’s white
residents—it had schools, a theater, a library, hospitals, and a thriving commercial street.
In many ways, this community, which contained people who were former slaves, was
well on its way to achieving the American Dream. The chapter explores how even if a
marginalized community is able to overcome the systemic barriers against it to attain the
American Dream, it can be forcibly and violently stripped of the ability to attain it
because the realization of prosperity becomes a threat to the racial hegemony.
The chapter will chronologically follow the legacy of the Tulsa Race Riots, first
examining how the black and white community constructed different memories of the
events in the immediate aftermath of the violence, and then following the riot’s legacy
through history through multiple primary sources before exploring the present
conversation around reparations and the Tulsa Race Riot’s new resurgence in our
collective memory embodied in the new HBO show The Watchmen. The chapter thus
presents one method for analyzing collective violence through the power/threat theory,
which is the idea that the dominant population will strike out against a minority
4

population if they are perceived to be amassing too much
(political/cultural/social/economic) capital. Even if the threat is not absolute, due to the
huge disparity in capital, many majority groups often lash out when capital is perceived
to be amassed too quickly or “catches up” to the status of the hegemonic group.
Interestingly, this often takes the form of social or cultural capital, rather than political or
economic, adding strength to the theory that it might have more to do with group pride
than group power.
The second case study in this thesis explores anti-Jewish pogroms during World
War II as a form of ethnic violence. The theories and questions explored in this chapter
relate to the creation of political hegemony and the consequences of competing national
projects. The pogroms occurred in primarily Polish and Ukrainian communities, often
with very little pressure or involvement from the Nazi forces. Fewer than 10% of these
communities experienced violence, leading scholars to wonder what set apart the
communities that did. This case study largely supports the findings of the previous one,
showing that violence typically stemmed from a desire to maintain Polish and Ukrainian
dominance, rather than anti-Semitic hatred. This case study is valuable because it
compares well with the Tulsa Race Massacre since it contains a similar power/threat
framework, but this threat was political and national rather than cultural and economic.
The pre-existing narrative focuses on the myths of Jewish culpability grounded in
theology and Nazi facilitation. This approach, while clear cut, fails to acknowledge that
anti-Semitism persisted throughout Germany and Eastern Europe, but civilian led
massacres occurred in a minority of localities. Furthermore, pinning the blame squarely
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on the Nazis ignores civilian culpability and the aspect of popular violence (violence with
mass participation.
When we assume that the Nazis forced the civilians to involve themselves, we not
only remove civilians from the category of perpetrators and ignore their role as complicit
witnesses, but we also ignore the pernicious factors at play that persuaded citizens to take
up arms against their Jewish neighbors. Nazis were often present but did not act as a
central force. The collapse of local order also meant that pogroms were conducted in
times of statelessness and so political elites could not be blamed. The violence was also
intimate, unlike the sanitized machine of the Holocaust. The violence was carried out
with clubs and shovels, and Jews were paraded through the town. The violent event was
often based on humiliating rituals and seemed intensely personal. Most scholarship on the
violence of the period focuses on Nazi involvement, economic rivalry, and the antiSemitic revenge theory. This chapter’s approach is to explore how pogroms were instead
a means by which to get rid of Jews because Jews were seen as future political rivals—
the deciding factor was the popularity of parties that pushed minority rights. In localities
in which Ukrainian and Polish political parties advocating for minority rights for Jews
were popular, pogroms were more likely to occur.
The next chapter explores violence as a result of nation-building and nationalism
and focuses on violence stemming from the 1947 Partition of British India. This chapter
will explore how political elites, specifically Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Mahatma Gandhi
and Jawarlal Nehru, were able to use religious rhetoric to construct national identities for
Hindus and Muslims, and then created polarizing and explosive situations wherein
6

violence was likely to break out to achieve their personal and political aims. The chapter
also explores how other elites within the All India Muslim League and the National
Congress stoked religious hatreds and spread propaganda that enabled the massacres to
become a wave of violence rather than random and localized bursts. Thus, while much of
the sentiment and violence was grounded in religious sentiment, the chapter will argue
that it would not have occurred with the intensity that it did without the threat of
independence and political inconsequentiality looming on the horizon. The chapter
focuses on the figure of Jinnah because Jinnah originally refused to deploy religious
rhetoric and felt that doing so was a dangerous strategy, but then decided to adopt it as a
means to emerge as the sole spokesman of India’s Muslims.
The Rwandan Genocide serves as a valuable case study because of the distinct
role that the Rwandan government played in its attempt to reconcile the two populations
to avoid immediate bloodshed. It embarked on a path to transitional justice and
education and thus represents the only case study in which there was an urgent need, and
therefore a strategy, to reconcile the two warring populations. This means that the
Rwandan Genocide, while certainly still with hidden motivations, does not seek to
villainize and polarize the population but rather acknowledges the plights of the victims
and perpetrators. The Rwandan Genocide was both intimate and popular, and emerged
largely out of the racialization of the Hutu/Tutsi difference by Belgian colonial ruling
strategies. The themes and theories explored in this chapter are the alien/native
dynamic—how Hutus were disenfranchised and considered to be less civilized, while the
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Tutsi were uplifted as superior, based on the Hamitic hypothesis3. This created a dynamic
wherein the Tutsi were seen as a privileged minority with access to power, parallel to
colonizers, which eventually led to them being constructed as an alien population within
the emergent nation-state. This chapter makes the point that ethnic divides can result in
massacres and pogroms, but a racial difference is required for genocide, and so it
examines how an ethnic difference was racialized to the point that almost everyone in
Rwanda became either a victim or a perpetrator. Further, it explores the significance of
historical memory and legacies of violence by analyzing the victim/perpetrator cycle
from the 1959 Revolution, to the later civil war and Rwandan Patriotic Front invasion
and eventually the genocide.4
Partition violence was not as intimate as the first case studies because the targets
were often refugee caravans and trains, but there was certainly popular participation.
Political elites used historical and theological myths to mold a national identity for
Hindus and Muslims and to exacerbate the Muslim threat to the Sikhs. Gandhi himself
had employed this strategy from the earlier part of the twentieth century, and Jinnah had
derided it as dangerously sectarian. After a humiliating defeat in the 1937 elections, it
became clear to Jinnah that he had to employ any tools necessary to regain political
capital. The distrust that existed between Jinnah and Nehru before Partition only
increased afterward, and that legacy festered on after the death of these key figures.
Pakistan and India are currently grappling with very similar conflicts and will continue to

3

Supposes that any progress and development among agricultural blacks was the result of
conquest or infiltration by pastoralists from northern or northeastern Africa, allegedly a branch of
the Caucasian race.
4 The Rwandan Patriotic Front is the current ruling political party in Rwanda. Its armed wing, led
by current president Paul Kagame, ended the Rwandan genocide in 1994.
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be plagued by these divisions unless there is an intentional strategy in place to break the
cycle and tell an honest history. Like the Partition, each of the case studies explored in
this thesis continue to unfold in the present and demonstrate the importance of legacies
and how we write history. In the case of the Tulsa Race Massacre, the current relevance
is reparations, and for anti-Jewish pogroms, it is the political upheaval in Poland. In both
these situations, responsible memorialization and legacy formation would lead to better
political situations that might mitigate the violence that the target communities face.
However, for the legacy of Partition, the effects are very direct. There are still consistent
Muslim massacres in India and skirmishes over Kashmir, and the rhetoric causing these
can be directly traced to the legacy of Partition. Reparations and memorialization would
right some past wrongs and create a moment of education, but it is not clear that it would
fully prevent violence against black Americans. With Poland, proper memorialization and
remembrance would likely prevent denialism and anti-Semitic narratives that allows
nationalist parties to gain a hold, and so would result in better civic and political
conditions for the Polish Jews, but it’s not necessarily true that it would prevent civilian
violence or hate crimes. With Pakistan/India and the next case study, the Rwanda
genocide, responsible legacy creation could prevent civilians from taking up their arms
against each other.

Historical Memory and Legacy Formation
This project is concerned with the ethics of history as a discipline and the
consequences of reproducing narratives without critically examining the notions they
perpetuate. These historiographic narratives do not reproduce neutrality, but often
9

reproduce an indifference that silences the most marginalized voices in the story. The
historical subjects of violence are vulnerable to power dynamics that are then reproduced
through irresponsible stewardship of their stories. It is not only important to resist
reproducing such irresponsible narratives to avoid these actors’ further subjugation within
historical paradigms, but also to avoid the potential use of such narratives to continue to
subjugate already precarious populations. The preservation of historical memory that
validates the diversity of collective violence is crucial since people build the present and
the future on the basis of the past, and so the past cannot be written in such a way that it
fulfills the original intent of violent acts. The past is often used as a moral lesson by
hegemonic groups to justify their actions or agenda. Historical analysis can intervene in
this discourse and the abuse of history as a means to retain power. Historical memory
also serves as a basis for hope and can act as a reconciliatory or uniting force. If legacies
can be used to resolve disputes and solve problems, since they act as common stories and
lessons, we may begin to use them to prevent or undo damage done.
History can be used as a self-affirming force in most cases, as individuals and
groups are able to find their own histories to cling to. Memory is subject to manipulation,
and so groups with ulterior motives will always be able to construct a version of events
that can incentivize a population to create conflict. Since the Holocaust, the theme of
“never forget” has been dominant but has not effectively guarded the world against
collective violence or genocidal tendencies. Even the Holocaust was justified on the basis
of historical myths of anti-Semitic legends. The Holocaust further proves the point that
most ideological groups have long held the belief that “they are destined in the long run
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to triumph over the infidels,”5 and groups in power are able to construct the “infidel” as
whomever they so choose. This makes it clear that the admonition to “never forget,” is
not enough, and rather, there must be an active attempt to preserve the past in a way that
does not diminish the true victims or incite further violence.
As memory passes from generation to generation, it changes. This is in part due to
the fragility of memory and in part due to elites manipulating history for their ends. This
process of passing on memories results in individual, group, and national identity
formation, and serves as a context from which people may choose to take further political
actions. As explained earlier, the process of establishing group identities is important
because how we define groups not only changes how one understands collective
violence, but how one creates it. In these case studies, it becomes clear that historical
myths (theological and sociological) and historical processes (accruing capital and status)
serve a dual purpose: the construction of group identities and the creation of the right
environment for violence.

5

Stuart Hampshire. Innocence and Experience (Harvard University Press, 1989), 136.
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Violence as a Result of Economic Threat: The Tulsa Race Massacres
“The things that abandon you get remembered different.
As precise as the English language can be, with words
Like penultimate and perseverate, there is not a combination
of sounds that describe only that leaving.”
“Blood History” by Dwayne Betts
The Myth of the American Dream and Power Threat Theory
The 1921 Tulsa Race Riots’ events were contested and controversial, even in
academia, until very recently. Even now, after the 1921 Tulsa Race Riot Commission
published A Report by the Oklahoma Commission to Study the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921 in
2001, no one knows exactly how many people died.6 The report could on corroborate the
bare bones story of events that as fact. The neighborhood of Greenwood, Tulsa was a
prosperous and thriving black community, especially by the standards of the time. The
community was doing well across the board: politically, culturally, socially, and
economically. “Black Wall Street” was a space that was unlike any other in the United
States at the time, until it was burned to the ground. The Tulsa Race Riots was one of the
nation’s darkest and bloodiest acts of violence, and one of the most defining acts of racial
violence. The economic and social capital of Greenwood caused a violent backlash from
white Tulsans, and the subsequent silence surrounding the riots served the same end of
oppressing an already marginalized group. The legacy of the Tulsa Race Riots illustrates
the importance of historical memories in reconciliation and rebuilding.

6
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The riots’ erasure from our historical memory brings up important questions
about the formation of historical and collective memory and the way enduring legacies of
momentous events are shaped. Moreover, the intentional nature of the riots’ violence
illuminates the hypocrisy of the American Dream myth. Some of the events of the Tulsa
Race Riots can be agreed upon. The black community did believe that Dick Rowland
would be lynched, and they knew that the reasons for his arrest were highly suspicious.
Dick Rowland was a 19 year old shoe-shiner who was accused of assaulting a 17 year old
white girl names Sarah Page. The black community also felt a pressure to act, believing
that his safety was in their hands. At the gathering of several hostile groups, tensions
worsened, and government forces did not take effective action to calm the situation. Once
violence erupted, civil officials chose to deputize some men. All these men were white
and some of them were participants in the violence. None of them caused the violence to
erupt, but many took actions that were illegal and potentially amplified the situation.
Public officials provided firearms and ammunition to civilians, all of them white men.
Units of Oklahoma’s National Guard mass arrested almost all of Greenwood’s residents
and detained them in mass holding centers or in other parts of the city. People, some of
them government officials, entered Greenwood and began to steal property left inside
homes and businesses. They then burned or destroyed over a thousand homes and
structures such as churches, schools, businesses, a hospital, and a library. No government
official at any level intervened. Credible estimates, such as those of the American Red
Cross, estimate that between one and three hundred people were killed.7 None of these
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acts have ever been prosecuted and rebuilding efforts were left to the victims of the
destruction.
The aforementioned series of events represents a barebones outline of the
violence that was carried out by one side of Tulsa on another, but there is an important
context to explore.8 Greenwood, or “Little Africa,” was a largely self-sufficient
community. The black people of Greenwood lived in relative freedom, with their own
hospital, school, theater, shops, and newspapers. Oklahoma was not plagued by the
traditions and racism of the Old South, and the black community often spoke out against
lynching and were advocates for equality. They believed that schools could be separate,
but they should be of the same quality—blacks, segregated, should receive the same
treatment as whites. These ideas were distributed in black newspapers, and often made
their way to courts.9 After World War I, there was even more talk of equal rights. Black
men had served in the military, risked their lives for their country, watched President
Wilson talk about the need for freedom and the horror of pogroms. The community was
vibrant and thriving.10 Economically, Greenwood’s businesses were a commercial
success. The area’s affluence and entrepreneurial spirit led many to call it “Black Wall
Street.” And Tulsa’s booming economy was, in part, dependent on this financial success
since black patrons had nowhere else to take their business. Limited by segregation, black
residents could not frequent downtown white-owned businesses. Intellectually,
politically, and religiously, Tulsa also stood apart. There were two newspapers, a library,
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all black Democrat and Republican clubs, and high church membership. By most
accounts, the residents of Greenwood, many slaves just sixty years prior, were on their
way to achieving the American Dream. This suggestion is not to imply that most
Greenwood residents were wealthy, but many were homeowners and seemed to have a
shot at class mobility.11
The Tulsa Race Riots may have been set off by the prospect of Dick Rowland’s
lynching, but the violence was no less motivated by an outrage at the economic ambitions
of black Tulsan’s and a fury at the audacity of black World War I veterans to demand
equality. A framework that is helpful to analyze the events of Tulsa in 1921 is Hubert
Blalock’s power threat theory.12 Blalock asserts that when a dominant group perceives an
economic or political threat from a minority group, the dominant group will take action to
maintain their hegemony. This theory has often been applied to situations of collective
violence to explain why one group would turn on another, even though they inhabit the
same communal and physical space. Greenwood’s wealth and prosperity created a violent
backlash intended to weaken the economic, and therefore political and social, power of
the black community in Tulsa.
Any chance of black Tulsans achieving the American Dream was intentionally
destroyed by the rioters. While social mobility in the way that white Tulsans experienced
it was probably never on the table for black Tulsans, they had been getting dangerously
close. There was a powerful upper class developing, and many had the means to amass
wealth. The swift and sudden destruction of Greenwood shows us how the American

11

12

Brophy, Reconstructing the Dreamland, 8.
Hubert Blalock, Toward a theory of minority-group relations, (New York: Wiley, 1967).

15

Dream has often played out historically for black communities. Even when they can
prosper, with the institutional and structural inequalities and injustices that they are faced
with, their wealth will be wiped out. The rioters were ruthlessly efficient in terms of
effectively wiping out all sources of wealth from the community, but there was also a
larger symbolic aim to be achieved: keeping a race in its place. There were individual
crimes committed against individual people, but intentional enough that these acts did not
serve as individual but rather as a collective trauma. Like a lynching, the Tulsa Race
Riots served not to “punish with death, but to terrify the living.”13 There was a message
to be sent. Ambitiousness and assertiveness were not tolerated from black Tulsans.
In the weeks following the riots, reactions revolved around the assignment of
blame. When the riot initially happened, it was front page news across America. The New
York Times ran the headline, “85 WHITES AND NEGROES DIE IN TULSA RIOTS.”14
Across the country, similar headlines appeared in newspapers.15 The Nation, often a
supporter of black causes, ran the headline, “The Eruption of Tulsa,”16 by Walter White.
This article is still considered to be one of the influential accounts of what happened, and
it is worth noting what language was used.17 The white woman who accused Dick
Rowland of assault is described as “hysterical.” The article goes on to discuss how black
Tulsans were often regarded as radical, and how that designation is absurd considering it
referenced their denunciation of Jim Crow era laws. Meanwhile in the Survey, Amy
Comstock wrote “Another View of the Tulsa Riots,” an article deflecting blame from
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Tulsa’s white citizenry and instead onto Tulsa’s poor black community.18 She argued that
it was the responsibility of white officials to fix the conditions that led to such poor
infrastructure and law enforcement, conditions that made it difficult to have “good
citizens.”19 She argues that Greenwood became a “crook’s paradise” but now Tulsa
officials would rebuild it to be a more sanitary area. She regularly equates cleanliness
with criminal activity, which is a common tool to avoid overtly equating cleanliness with
black people (or other people of color). These two articles work somewhat as a summary
of the black reaction versus the white reaction in Tulsa, but do not adequately convey the
sense of remorse on behalf of the white community in Tulsa. In the immediate aftermath
of the riots, there was remorse and a promise to rebuild. But the blame from white Tulsa
was still on “bad negroes” and the criminals of Greenwood. In fact, Tulsa Mayor T.D.
Evans was happy the destruction was limited to Greenwood: “I say it was good
generalship to let the destruction come to the where the trouble was hatched up, put in
motion, and where it had its inception.”
The search for blame continued in the press. The New York Times published two
articles on June 4th and June 5th (1921), first implying responsibility on the part of the
African Blood Brotherhood, and then releasing a statement by the head of the
organization denying it. The Blood Brotherhood say that they believe in black people’s
right to self-defense, but did not intentionally incite the riot.20 The Chicago Tribune ran
“POLICE AIDED TULSA RIOTERS,” a long piece summarizing the events leading to
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the riot, and focusing on how the police intentionally gave “armed white ruffians” guns to
help them murder black Tulsans.21 Within Tulsa, the conversation had taken on a peculiar
tone. While there was an emphasis on rebuilding and restoring Greenwood and raising
funds for victims, the discourse about “bad black” men was thriving. There was a sense
that the riot had originated from black Tulsans’ decision to take the law into their own
hands. The idea was that they should have trusted the law to protect Dick Rowland. Most
articles agree that there was significant white criminal behavior in the riots but frame the
criminality as a reaction to black provocation. The conversation for white interpreters
was often framed by the purported arrogance of Greenwood residents and discussed how
their ideas of racial equality were inflammatory and led to the agitation that eventually
provoked the riot.22
The white interpretation of the riot is key to understanding why the riots began. In
a white paper, appearing a few days after the riots, the article emphasized kindness where
there was hatred: “The white citizens of Tulsa have forgotten the bitter hatred and their
desperation that caused them to meet the negroes in battle to the death Tuesday night and
are now thinking of them only as helpless refugees.”23 If the white Tulsans were trying to
put Greenwood residents in their place through the riot, seeing them as victims afterwards
supported this aim. Greenwood residents as helpless victims and refugees perpetuates the
narrative that they are no longer a threat to white authority. Now, they are subject to

“Police Aided Tulsa Rioters,” The Chicago Defender, June 11, 1921.
Brophy, Reconstructing the Dreamland, 71.
23
Brophy, Reconstructing the Dreamland, 73.
21
22

18

white pity and reliant on white charity for help. Their kindness is not to suggest that
white Tulsans viewed black Tulsans in a positive light. Black Tulsans were still seen as
criminals, childlike, arrogant and lazy. The white hegemony and social control remained
intact and was not threatened by white kindness to black Tulsans but upheld by it.
These views were made official in the Grand Jury report. The report considered
predominantly white accounts of the riots and chose evidence so selectively that it was
essentially a retelling of the white side of the story. The report blamed social agitation
amongst the blacks and a breakdown of law enforcement.24 Key to blaming the riots on
the black Tulsans was the denial of the lynching threat. If the threat of Dick Rowland
lynching was nonexistent, the veteran’s initial actions are no longer defensible.
Therefore, it is easy to frame the riots as black Tulsans inciting violence in a space in
which there was none, and framing the white Tulsans as peaceful and innocent, swept up
in the violence as it erupted. The report also focused on law enforcement and talked about
how there was a breakdown of governance in Greenwood. To prevent more incidents like
the riots, policing and enforcement should be stricter in Greenwood, and whites and
blacks should not be allowed to mingle freely in dance halls. Black Tulsans also viewed
the riots through the lens of a breakdown of the law, but they saw the law as having failed
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to protect Greenwood from violence.25 They viewed the riots as being part of a long
pattern in which they were denied equal protection under the law.
In the weeks and days following the riots, there was significant news attention.
Most of the press was negative, many papers offered harsh condemnations of the events
in Tulsa. The Christian Recorder
called the incident a “shame upon
America.”26 For Tulsan citizens,
and especially for public or civil
officials, this kind of attention was
totally undesirable. Oklahoma and
Tulsa were growing economic
Credits: Greenwood Cultural Center
Figure 1: The aftermath of Tulsa Race Massacre

centers, desperate for people to

move in and contribute to growth. People feared that this kind of negative press attention
would turn away prospective residents and business owners. For Tulsa’s white business
and political leaders, it was clear that this entire affair had to be swept under the rug.
Historically, it is remarkable that the silence was created so effectively. History
textbooks published in the next two decades did not mention it, news stories began to
disappear, and collective memory began to view this as an event that invoked shame
rather than pride.27 In the decades immediately following the riots there wasn’t much
acknowledgement of them. The Chicago Defender published a piece in July of 1922
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called “Will Tulsa Riot Horrors Awaken America’s Indifferent Attitude,” but that seemed
to be the end of the conversation for years.28

The Legacy That Formed and Our Collective Memory
Until very recently, the riots legacy has been one of silence. The Tulsa Race Riot
report summarizes the reactions to and engagement with the events of the Tulsa Race
Riots from its inception to the report’s publication. In short, there was very little activity
until 1946. There were a few attempts by teachers and professors, such as Nancy
Feldman, a sociology professor at the University of Tulsa in 1946, to engage with the
material but they were met with little success until Loren Gill decided to make the riots
the subject of his master’s thesis.29 A white World War II veteran, he was attending the
University of Tulsa when his interest was caught by the lingering memories of the riots.
His product, named “The Tulsa Race Riot,” was a result of impressive research skills and
diligent investigative work.30 Despite his efforts, however, records about the riots
remained buried and talk of the riots remained out of the public arena.
Change began to be seen in the 1950s through the 1970s. As debates, nationally
and in Tulsa, began about segregation and civil rights it was increasingly difficult to
ignore Tulsa’s bloody and racist past. On June 1st, 1971, African American riot survivors
gathered in Mount Zion Baptist Church to commemorate the riots. There were a few
dozen survivors, and a few audience members, and it was the first public
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acknowledgement of the riots in decades. In the same spring, there was another attempt at
public acknowledgement. The publications manager at the Tulsa Chamber of Commerce
decided that there should be an article published about the Tulsa Race Riots to
commemorate its fiftieth anniversary. He hired Ed Wheeler, the host of ‘The Gilcrease
Story,’ a popular history radio program, to research and write the article, and Wheeler
agreed to do it. Wheeler dug up old records and spoke to dozens of riots survivors.
Twice, he was threatened and told not to write the article. Both times he ignored the
threats and forged ahead. The article, once written, was revolutionary and included never
before published pictures, but the Chamber of Commerce killed the article. He had to
publish it in Impact Magazine, a new and black oriented magazine, which limited the
article’s audience from being citywide. There were similar efforts to bring the Tulsa Race
Riots into the limelight through the 1970s. But all of them, like Wheeler’s article, were
largely unsuccessful. But even if it were not in the spotlight, it was a little closer to the
light, and laid the groundwork for efforts in the coming decades that would finally give
the riots the attention they deserved.
In the years before the Tulsa Race Riot report’s publication, there was a surge in
interest in the riots. Leading up to the eightieth anniversary of the riots, stories about the
riots appeared in most major publications and news stations. Less visible, but even more
important, efforts were made to investigate and research the riots academically. Scholars
began to comb through archives and conduct oral interviews to compile an accurate
history of the riots so the incident might be more fully documented. The report itself was
a tremendous undertaking and acted as a locator of a muddied truth. The Tulsa Race Riot
report is an incredibly powerful document and wrote the history of an event that had been
22

intentionally forgotten and silenced. If the riots were undertaken by white Tulsans in
order to relegate black Tulsans to a lower status, and history is written in a way that
reflects the voices of white Tulsans, there is no way to make up for the injustices of the
past. ‘Objective’ reports and documentation can often act as a means by which to silence
histories depending on the agendas of the authors. If this report had simply written a
history based off the sources easily available, it would have achieved the same effect. The
intentional creation of historical memory, achieved with the Tulsa Race Riot report, was
key in the path to reconciliation and rebuilding.
While the Tulsa Race Riots re-emerged as part of a national collective memory
after their eightieth anniversary, 2018 and 2019 saw a resurgence in the conversation
surrounding the riots. In December 2017,
the Tulsa 2021 project was announced.31
This project, in turn, established the 1921
Tulsa Race Riots Centennial Commission
to “develop programs, projects, events and
activities to commemorate and inform.”32
Specifically, the commission’s aim is to
work on fostering sustainable
Credit: 1921 Tulsa Race Massacre Centennial
Commission
Figure 2: Logo for the 1921 Tulsa Race Massacre
Centennial Commission

entrepreneurship and heritage tourism
within the Greenwood District. In

November 2018, the chair of the commission, Senator Kevin Matthews, announced that
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the commission would change its name.33 He changed the name from the 1921 Tulsa
Race Riots Centennial Commission to the 1921 Tulsa Race Massacre Centennial
Commission. The designation of massacre, rather than riots, is important for a few
reasons. Firstly, the name change caught on and academic circles have since begun to
refer to the riots as a massacre instead. Secondly, it serves an important historical purpose
in terms of accuracy. Massacre adequately conveys how one group had significantly
more power than the other and killed members of that group along racial lines. Massacre
conveys intentionality. Riots does not. Thirdly, the “riot” designation was the grounds
upon which insurance companies turned away the claims of the black victims. The
language used was significant in the obstacles to rebuilding and undermined avenues for
legal action. The change of name is thus important as it works to acknowledge the
injustice and constitutes a step towards reparations.
Legal and journalistic acknowledgement is important but does not fully succeed
in terms of putting the massacre in
the public consciousness. In October
2019, The Watchmen premiered on
HBO. The opening scene of the
show depicts the Tulsa Race
Credit: HBO

Massacre and suggested it could be a

Figure 3: Scene from The Watchmen's pilot episode on
Tulsa.

recurring plot point. In the show’s

alternate timeline, reparations have been paid to victim’s families and bitterness about
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this lingers amongst white supremacists.34 This led to a slew of articles that commented
on HBO’s decision to focus on this event, and serve as a means to explain the “history”
of the Tulsa Race Massacre. Articles appeared in The New York Times,35 The Washington
Post,36 Vox,37 and The Atlantic,38 among others. A whole generation that had previously
never heard of the riots was exposed to the controversy and the cultural commentary that
The Watchmen and subsequent media provided. The first episode created a social media
storm, with most viewers articulating that they had never heard of the Tulsa horrors.39
The Watchmen brought the Tulsa Race Massacre back into our collective memory by
linking it to popular culture. The show also restarted the conversation about reparations
with the presentation of their alternate timeline. The lingering bitterness amongst white
supremacists speaks to the omnipresent existence of anti-Black sentiment and violence
and breaks the façade of a post-race society. The show serves as a commentary on how
American society still grapples with racial violence and a racial hegemony because it
never acknowledged the horrific violence of the past.

Current Relevance: Reparations
The Tulsa Race Massacre was one symptom of a pervasive and deeply rooted
symptom of white supremacy in the US. This country is still grappling with the legacy of
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redlining and racist housing laws. Police brutality terrorized black people right after
slavery and still does. The net worth of the average white family is almost ten times
greater than the average black family.40 Without acknowledging the real history of racial
violence in this country, it is doomed to continue to exist in a racial system. There is an
effective solution, and it would be to commission a group to study the question of
reparations and assess possible solutions. This commission would be tasked with
uncovering decades of anti-Black racism and would inevitably have to produce a report
acknowledging it.41
Tulsa dodged its responsibility to rebuild and to administer reparations. The city
was tasked with establishing order, reuniting loved ones, and providing food, shelter, and
clothing for the affected families. However, beyond initial promises to rebuild fueled by
remorse, the city quickly sidestepped their responsibilities. The conversation was quickly
reframed to focus on rebuilding Greenwood geographically far away from white Tulsa
and making sure it was “cleaner” and better policed in its second iteration. The Oklahoma
legal and political system, as usual, left black citizens without hope of justice. The
reparations debate concerning the Tulsa Race Massacre exists at both a local and a
national level, with academic and policy makers working together to come to a
constructive conclusion. However, it is important to acknowledge the role that the shape
of historical legacies play in the path to reconciliation. Financial reparations are only one
of the ways in which injustice must be grappled with to facilitate healing. The role of
memorialization and documentation is also crucial for reconciliation and redress, and for
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the national conversation about race in the US. Without honestly grappling with the past,
it is nearly impossible to pursue a meaningful and purposeful conversation about racism.
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Violence as a Result of Political Threat: Anti-Jewish Pogroms
“While helicopters bomb the streets, whatever they will open, will open.
What is silence? Something of the sky in us.”
“Deaf Republic” by Ilya Kaminsky
Political Hegemony and Threat

In the aftermath of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, there were
waves of massacres of Jewish people throughout Ukrainian and Polish localities. This
level of brutality is not particularly surprising, given that it paralleled the Nazi regime’s
systematic extermination of the Jewish people in Germany and Poland. Not all cases of
anti-Semitic violence were pogroms—the key feature of a pogrom is that it was civilian
led. These massacres were not carried out by the Nazi establishment but rather by
civilians and did not break out in most localities despite general anti-Semitic sentiment.
This civilian led violence requires explanation since these instances of collective violence
generally occurred in small localities in which people had known each other for several
years, if not decades. The fact that there was a collapse of local order also means that the
violence cannot be blamed on political elites, who often play a significant role in
situations of ethnic violence.
The Nazis were often present during pogroms but did not act as a central authority
and their efforts to incite pogroms often failed. The pervasive presence of German army
units, police battalions, and mobile killings has clear historical evidence. However, it
seems that while Nazis might have desired more generalized anti-Semitic violence, they
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did not force it.42 In the case of anti-Jewish pogroms, violence was situational rather than
inherent. Their situationality means that we can compare localities to discover specific
causes for these instances of collective violence that occurred along ethnic lines but were
not exclusively motivated by ethnic hatred.
Anti-Jewish sentiment and anti-Semitic hatred are leading theories to explain
pogroms given that there is a long history of brutality and victimization of Jews in
Eastern Europe (and elsewhere). These were not the first pogroms to occur. There was
considerable evidence of anti-Semitic sentiment in preceding periods, and there had been
repeated pogroms in many localities even just within the early part of the twentieth
century. Further, Jews faced violence and discrimination (officially and unofficially) in
their economic and social lives as well. Jews were subjected to a range of prejudices and
stereotypes by non-Jews. There is anecdotal evidence that non-Jews viewed Jews with
hostility and as an alien element. A lot of the anti-Jewish sentiment was construed in
religious terms, for example labeling Jews as Christ-killers, which then evolved into the
modern stereotypes that persisted, for example, in the form of labels such as swindlers or
communists. While anti-Semitic sentiment had strong roots in Poland going back
thousands of years, if anti-Semitic hatred was the primary driving force behind pogroms,
we would see far more pogroms than we do. Anti-Semitic sentiment tells a very
important aspect of the story, but it is nevertheless only one aspect. Politically, Jews were
consistently put in a position to have to defend the few minority rights that they
possessed amidst various restrictive laws.
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Pogroms typically followed a routine of ritual humiliation. The humiliation
generally centered around perceived Jewish religious norms, or perceived support for the
Soviet occupation.43 Another defining characteristic of the violence was that it was not
sterile—the violence was intimate. Perpetrator could not kill scores of people from far
away- the violence was conducted in communal spaces and carried out by murderers who
knew the Jews that they were beating to death. The violence was distinct from what the
Nazis conducted elsewhere, which was sanitized and intended to be carried out on an
industrial scale. Perpetrators in the pogroms used shovels and clubs, and the violence was
carried out in full view of the town. The perpetrators were often neighbors or landlords.
This was not a case of ethnic hatred causing perpetrators to mentally dehumanize their
enemy—the perpetrators were clearly aware of the humanity of their victims. The
dilemma of ethnic violence is that the violence is not distant, sterile, or sanitized, and so
one has to acknowledge the humanity of their victims.
A majority of the scholarship that focuses on pogroms explores the following few
explanations: economic rivalry, Jewish collaboration with the Soviet Union, and antiSemitism. These explanations do not fully account for the unique nature of these pogroms
in Poland and the Ukraine. For this reason, we might also explore the case of anti-Jewish
pogroms through the power-threat theory framework. However, the threat in this
historical context might best be understood as political rather than cultural. While the
economic and social capital of Greenwood caused a violent backlash from white Tulsans,
it was primarily the political threat in Polish and Ukrainian localities that caused the
massacres to occur. Pogroms did not always occur in communities with sharp cultural
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divides, or those with Nazis present. In fact, it was often the Nazis who were able to step
in and mitigate the violence. One of the best approaches to the political valences of the
power/threat theory is the scholarship of Jeffrey Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg.44 Their
recent book, Intimate Violence, locates the main cause of this example of ethnic violence
in political polarization. They theorize that pogroms were a strategy by which non-Jews
attempted to rid themselves of future political rivals. The deciding factor was the
popularity of parties supporting minority rights. Kopstein and Wittenberg, after analyzing
voting data from two thousand localities, find that there are three main factors that
influence the probability that a pogrom will occur: the support for Polish and Ukrainian
parties advocating ethnic tolerance, the demographic presence of Jews, and the degree to
which Jews advocated for national equality with Poles and Ukrainians. The similarity
between these factors lies in the centrality of Jewish people being suspect for Polish and
Ukrainian nationalists.
The first factor often played itself out between the National Democrats and their
allies, who sought minimal minority rights, and the pluralist BBWR, Bezpartyjny Blok
Współpracy z Rządem, which favored minority rights in exchange for loyalty to Poland.45
While Ukrainians were largely a minority in Poland, they constituted a majority in some
regions of Galicia and inhabitants felt strongly about their sovereignty from Poles.
However, they, too, were conflicted about the extent to which Jews should be included in
their nationalist agenda. If we accept that the power threat theory might meaningfully
apply to these situations, pogroms were most likely to occur in localities in which
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popularity of tolerant parties indicated a population supportive of pluralistic nationbuilding policies. In these areas, nationalists would feel the threat to their political
hegemony more keenly. Therefore, it would make sense to attack Jews to delay any
recognition of their national rights. Of course, according to this theory, there would be no
pogroms in localities in which Jewish rights were respected. Unsurprisingly, situations
like this are extremely rare. This is the way in which anti-Semitism and myths of Jewish
culpability play a key role in collective violence. While ethnic hatred was not the
defining motivator of the massacres, it created the fragile environment in which political
fractures could cause brutal violence.
The second factor described by Kopstein and Wittenberg is demographic: the
number of Jewish relative to that of non-Jewish inhabitants. In this reading, the increased
size of the Jewish population corresponds to a higher chance of a pogrom occurring. This
was probable for two reasons. First, increased Jewish visibility made Jewish people an
easier target. Second, simply the numerical increase of Jewish people created a
substantial threat to Ukrainian and Polish political dominance. A further point of nuance
with the demographic analysis was the tension within the Jewish community between
assimilation and cultural autonomy. Jewish people were not able to align themselves
politically with Polish and Ukrainian nationalists because that would cost them their
cultural autonomy. Therefore, Jewish people were put in a difficult situation, from which
they could not emerge without causing distrust. Like the Tulsa Race Massacre, in which
the economic threat was dependent on cultural autonomy, the Jewish community’s
political threat was exacerbated by their cultural autonomy.
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The third factor is the fraction of Jews that supported recognition of a distinct
nation equal to that of Poles or Ukrainians. The political cause of Jewish nationalism had
the least support amongst non-Jews. Minority rights for Jews was unpopular, but the idea
of Jews wanting to engage fully in political life drew some sympathy. Even nonnationalist Poles and Ukrainians were hostile to the idea of Jewish self-government and
comprehensive Hebrew and Yiddish education. Localities in which Jews pushed for
national equality with a majority group were highly vulnerable to pogroms. Collective
violence in these situations was especially likely to occur because non-Jews felt the least
community solidarity and connection with their Jewish neighbors. While Jews were, in
some senses, segregated from their neighbors, they still existed in the same community.
Furthermore, the violence was intimate because of how it was carried out- in common
spaces with shovels and clubs. This not only meant that there was a greater number of
potential killers, but also a larger number of non-Jews who were willing to be complicit
in the massacres and not intervene on the behalf of their Jewish neighbors. Kopstein and
Wittenberg equate Jewish nationalism to the proportion of Jews who supported parties
advocating minority rights.
Even beyond a greater number of potential killers, there were many people who
were complicit. In cases of collective violence, the role of the non-perpetrators is key.
This engineers the right “social environment for killing.”46 Not only could nonperpetrators often intervene or rescue Jews, but perpetrators often would not act violently
if they did not suspect popular support for their actions. In this way, it was bystanders
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that set the tone for the community.47 Massacres typically could not occur in situations
that had some opposition to the violence, especially because they occurred in small
communities and the massacres required significant community involvement. This was
especially true in situations in which those who were against violence were community
leaders, like priests or teachers, or other figures with recognized authority. In most of the
pogrom situations, however, it seemed that even those who should have had a reason to
mitigate the violence could not muster sufficient sympathy. This points to the fact that
even the bare minimum of solidarity was not present between the Jews and non-Jews.
The Lwów Pogrom (currently Lviv) in June 1941 is a good example of the role
that non-perpetrators play in shaping the dynamics of the urban crowd ultimately
responsible for the violence. Jews were forced to clean the streets on their hands and
knees, a form of ritual humiliation that was often used in anti-Semitic violence. Women
were singled out for a special type of violence: they were beaten with sticks and tossed
from one pogromist to another. Often, they were undressed and ridiculed.48 Jewish people
were marched to the prison as they were beaten, stoned, and ridiculed by onlookers. It is
important to note that there were onlookers who did not participate in active violence but
took part in name calling and served as complicit witnesses.49 Ukrainian nationalists
played an important role in the violence and felt especially threatened by Jewish
nationalism.50 Ukrainian militiamen went from house to house to round up Jews for
47
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abuse.51 Beyond their motivations for violence, they also had the means to implement it.
While the Ukrainian nationalists were the initiators of the violence, the crowd was crucial
in influencing the course of events. It was typical of pogroms for random elements to join
the violence and perpetuate it, and what happened in Lviv embodies these trends. As
militiamen marched Jews to prisons, civilians attacked the Jews from the sidelines. The
militiamen were happy to let the crowd play out its riotous nature and sustain the ritual
and sexual humiliation of Jews on the streets. The violence perpetuated by the urban
crowd was doubtless influenced by anti-Semitism and insecurity over the Soviet
occupation, but the fact that Jews were considered to be “outsiders” of the community,
were present in large numbers, and were mobilized into their own nation-building
projects were key elements that allowed this hatred to be acted on.
The pogrom in Borysław in November 1941 also depended on the involvement of
the urban crowd. The carnival atmosphere is present in multiple testimonies describing
the violence.52 Recorded testimonies describe how murderers were egged on by hysterical
laughter and cheering by large crowds, and that the atmosphere in the streets was
generally cheerful, as though celebrating a festival. In Irene Horowitz’s account of the
violence, Jews were made to dance and perform tricks. Survivors described the town as a
hunting ground in which Jews were the prey.53 Horowitz goes on to describe how many
people were killing neighbors and friends that they had known all their lives with pipes
and shovels in full view of the public. This targeted violence was intimate, but it was also
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an attempt to remove that source of intimacy and closeness. The aim of the violence was
to marginalize, and in some cases totally remove, a group perceived to be a threat.

Narrative of Jewish Culpability and Anti-Semitism As the Motivator
In the typical method of scholarship approaching the Holocaust, the abstract ideas
of Jewish culpability and ethnic hatred are seen as key, but Kopstein and Wittenberg
locate the catalyst in the political threat. The power-threat theory applies itself well to this
case study, as it does with the Tulsa Race Massacre, because pogroms also occur in a
situation in which a disenfranchised minority is beginning to fight for its rights. In Tulsa,
this presented itself primarily via an economic and cultural threat to the racial hegemony.
In the case of the pogroms, national rights were the key agitator. The cultural threat was
likely exacerbating the issue, in the sense that Jews would have been willing to settle for
robust minority rights instead of national rights were they willing to assimilate and lose
their cultural sovereignty. To be clear, this approach is not meant to discount the real
implications of anti-Semitism in ethnic violence. Poland and Ukraine’s history are replete
with anti-Semitic violence and oppression, and Jewish individuals and activists would
likely not have advocated for minority or national rights without that history. There are
various historical explanations for the outbreak of pogroms, such as revenge, anti-Semitic
hatred and Jewish culpability. These approaches have altered the way in which we
conceive of Jewish history and how we memorialize anti-Semitic violence. The
power/threat theory intervenes in this problematic discourse.
Revenge is one of the most enduring explanations of pogroms. Many believed
that Jews collaborated with the Soviet Union during the Red Army’s harsh occupation of
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Poland, and so pogroms could have been a mechanism of revenge for perceived Jewish
collaboration. This is somewhat consistent with the historical evidence. We cannot be
sure of how all Jews felt in regard to the Soviet invasion, but many felt relief. Having
experienced harsh oppression, Soviet occupation offered the opportunity of civic
equality, as oppressive as it might be in other regards, and was much preferable to Nazi
rule in western Poland. Any relief that was openly expressed, as rare as that might have
been, would only have served to exacerbate poor relations. Also, while all groups
suffered under Soviet occupation, Jewish status increased relative to Polish and Ukrainian
status because they were suddenly able to be (theoretically) as involved in government as
Poles or Ukrainians, as limited as that involvement may be. Roger Petersen argues that
this relative loss of status resulted in a Polish and Ukrainian resentment at their lack of
national citizenship that primarily drove pogrom violence, regardless of the fact that Jews
were not responsible for the reversal of fortunes.54 Furthermore, as mentioned earlier,
Jews were often forced to undergo ritual humiliation during pogroms. Much of the ritual
humiliation associates them with the Soviet regime- for example, in Siematycze, Jews
were made to dismantle a Lenin statue with hammers and sickles.55 These incidences
suggest that non-Jewish populations did blame Jews for the Soviet occupation, given the
strong association between the symbols of Soviet nation-building. The revenge theory is
important to analyze for two reasons: first, it is important to explore whether Jewish
collaboration was legitimately a leading cause of anti-Semitic violence and second, it is
necessary to explore whether non-Jewish attitudes were pervasive based on the evidence
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present. These two paths of exploration are necessary because there is an important
distinction, in terms of culpability and historical memory, between the punishment of
perceived national traitors and the inhumane persecution of innocents. In the first case,
while the mode of punishment is inhumane and horrific, one might be able to sympathize
with the motivating sentiments. In the latter case, there is no defense to be had.
However, Kopstein and Wittenberg cast significant doubt on the theory of Jewish
collaboration. Firstly, while some Jews certainly collaborated with the Soviet authorities,
so did some non-Jews. They examine regional studies to confirm that while Jewish
fortunes improved relative to other groups, they were still underrepresented in
administrative posts in absolute and relative terms.56 More influential positions were
overwhelmingly non-Jewish, and so if pogroms were really about collaboration, they
should have been aimed at non-Jewish collaborators. This seems to mean that anti-Jewish
sentiment far outweighed anti-Soviet sentiment when it came to violence, and myths of
Jewish collaboration have more to do with anti-Jewish stereotypes that existed far before
Soviet occupation. This nullifies the Jewish collaboration theory and emphasizes the
distrust of the Jewish population. This chapter argues that this distrust would not have
turned into violence without the Jewish population being seen as future political rivals.

Current Relevance: Memorialization in Poland And Germany and Its Consequences
The enduring causes of collective violence in our historical memory are important
because they inform our current responses to Jewish culture and, very importantly, the
tactics deployed for the memorialization of anti-Jewish violence. The Jewish story is not
56
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one of endless persecution and doom, even though their community has been historically
oppressed. It is important that we tell a holistic and rich story that reflects the history of
the Jewish community in Eastern Europe. Given that the nature of anti-Jewish violence,
the Holocaust, and pogroms, focused on wiping out a community and a culture, it is
unsurprising that there is not much evidence left behind. It is difficult to come to a
consensus on who was responsible for the atrocities committed against the Jewish people.
Given that anti-Semitism is still very much alive and well, memorialization is
increasingly important, especially in Germany and Poland, where most of the violence
was perpetuated. The case studies of Berlin and Warsaw provide an interesting
comparison for competing projects of memorialization and its implications.
Berlin is a city with a layered history and has a wealth of memorials dedicated to
its past, primarily World War II and the Cold War. After World War II, memorialization
became an important policy priority in terms of reconciling German culpability. “The
term Vergangenheitsbewältigung, which literally translates as ‘coping with the past,’ has
become a key concept in post-1945 German culture and describes the way in which
Germans discuss and confront their history.”57 It was reunification in 1990 that really
began the trend of memorialization. Germany was the first to recognize a national day of
remembrance for the Holocaust. The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe is the
most famous of Germany’s memorials and the most controversial. It has been criticized
as failing to address the suffering of the individual victims of the Holocaust, and for
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allowing the suffering to be anonymous.58 Many have argued that the abstract and
symbolic nature of the memorial allows the horrific nature of the violence to be buried.
Well-known German political commentator Hendrik M. Broder states, the Memorial is
“not meant to commemorate the Jews,” but rather “is meant to flatter the Germans.”59
Critics also argue that the title evades culpability, given that it does not answer the
question of “murdered by whom?” In defense of the memorial, some have argued that its
abstract nature allows German citizens to gain a sense of collective responsibility because
they are able to interpret the
memorial as they want.
Peter Eisenman, the creative
force behind the monument,
was intentional in its design.

Credit: Pierre Adenis

He wanted an abstract

Figure 4: Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe

monument because he felt that a traditional design would be inadequate for capturing the
varied atrocities of the Holocaust. He believes that the viewer does not have to fully
understand the memorial, because understanding the history behind it is impossible, and
the memorial allows viewers to accept evil as a part of the natural world.60
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The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe is Berlin’s most visible memorial,
but most other attempts at memorialization were woven into the landscape of the city.
One of these is the Places of Remembrance memorial, which consists of 80 signposts,
each displaying a different anti-Semitic law from Nazi Germany. Another one of these
are the “Stumbling Blocks,” cobblestone-sized brass plates inscribed with the name and
available information about victims of the Holocaust scattered throughout the streets of
the city where Jews resided and worked. These memorials were also met with
controversy, but many inhabitants are appreciative of the German government’s attempts
to acknowledge its violent history.
Warsaw’s approach to memorialization is not as robust as Berlin’s, and far more
recent. Public memorials do not exist and walking through Warsaw one would never
know what had happened in those very streets just 75 years ago. Warsaw’s architecture
does not suggest the past harshness of an anti-Semitic regime or the existence of a Jewish
ghetto. One of the main differences between Warsaw and Berlin’s approaches to
memorialization is that the German government chose to make memorialization a
priority, whereas the Polish government remained largely uninvolved. This is likely
largely because Polish governments since the end of World War II have often been right
wing, anti-Semitic, or both, and more interested in suppressing Poland’s ugly past than
acknowledging it. Warsaw’s attempts at memorialization have been pushed by private
actors and nonprofits.
One of the main examples of this is the Polin Museum in Warsaw, which
celebrates a thousand year history of Poland’s Jewish people. The museum is one of the
main institutions in Warsaw that acts as a prism into Warsaw’s past, as well as an
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educational force for those who would like to engage with Jewish culture. It was pushed
by the Association of the Jewish Historical Institute of Poland for many years before
garnering some support from the
Polish government in 2005. Still,
the museum is constantly under
threat from various laws enacted by
the Polish government since its
Credit: Wojciech Kryński
Figure 5: POLIN Museum faces the Monument to the Ghetto
Heroes.

opening in 2014. For example, in
February of 2018, the Polish
President decided to support a law

“making it illegal to accuse ‘the Polish nation’ of complicity in the Holocaust and other
Nazi atrocities,” which is effectively historical revisionism.61
Berlin’s Jewish population is the fastest growing in Europe.62 Once the epicenter
of horrific anti-Semitic violence, the city welcomes thousands of young Israelis yearly.
Meanwhile, Jews in Poland have been concerned with Holocaust denialism and antiSemitism for many years. While much of this difference comes from having a left wing
versus right wing government, there is something to be said for Berlin’s collective
memory versus Warsaw’s. While anti-Semitism is still present in Berlin, it is difficult to
deny a historical event that so thoroughly consumes the architecture of your city. On the
other hand, if one were to grow up in Warsaw, all education about Poland’s bloody past
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requires one to opt in. There are no public memorials, and historical education in schools
does not discuss anti-Semitism. Berlin’s citizens have a far more democratic access to
historical education.
Memorialization and historical memory as a whole are key to avoiding future
mass violence. This is clear not only from Berlin and Warsaw’s different cultures, but
also from exploring how pogroms were motivated. A historical enmity easily shifts into
violence in times of political pressure and crisis, and a clear historical record is important
to combat dangerous and divisive historical myths. Perhaps there would have been less
violence, or less humiliation during the violence of pogroms, had the non-Jewish people
not linked Jews with communism, or had they not believed the Jewish collaboration
myth. Poland’s example also shows us that without historical memory, it is easy for
political elites to distort the past to serve their own ends. In the worst case scenario,
political elites can distort the past to divide communities and spark violence.
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Violence as A Result of Nationalism: Pakistan/India Partition Violence
“Two or three years after the 1947 Partition, it occurred to the governments of
India and Pakistan to exchange their lunatics in the same manner as they had
exchanged their criminals. The Muslim lunatics in India were to be sent over to
Pakistan and the Hindu and Sikh lunatics in Pakistani asylums were to be handed
over to India.
It was difficult to say whether the proposal made any sense or not. However, the
decision had been taken at the topmost level on both sides.”
Toba Tek Singh by Saadat Hasan Manto
Political Elite Theory and Nationalist Rhetoric
In August 1947, the British left after three hundred years and the subcontinent
was partitioned into India and Pakistan. This began one of the largest migrations in
human history, as millions of Muslims headed to Pakistan in search of a better life, a life
in which they would be the majority. Millions of Hindus and Sikhs, in search of the same
thing, headed in the opposite direction, seeking the safety of the Hindu-majority state. In
theory, this separation did not matter. Pakistan and India have more in common with each
other than any other country on the planet, politically, culturally, and socially.
Economically, they were inextricable. Strategically, Pakistan had the only land invasion
routes to India. The Indian Army, soon to be divided, had fought as one for a century.
Hindu and Muslim soldiers swore oaths of undying brotherhood, Hindu and Muslim
politicians had spent years fighting against the British together and had families that had
spent decades socializing with each other.
And yet, over seventy years later, Partition’s bloody legacy still haunts India,
Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Across the subcontinent, communities that had coexisted for
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almost a millennium, as friends and neighbors, attacked each other in what amounted to a
mutual genocide. This violence was especially horrific in Punjab, with massacres, arson,
forced conversions, mass abductions and barbaric sexual violence. Refugee trains arrived
at their destinations full of corpses, foot caravans of unarmed and poor refugees were
subject to guerilla
ambushes. Estimates of
the dead, though the
range is wide (between
200,000 to two
million), are
universally shocking.
Credits: Creative Commons

The carnage, though

Figure 6: A special refugee train at Ambala Station in February 1954 in
northern India. The 1947 Partition of India resulted in the largest human
migration in history, lasting years.

appalling, was
relatively confined to a

period of six weeks. Although the worst of the violence was confined to a limited period,
by 1948, more than fifteen million people had been uprooted and up to two million were
dead.
Partition is central to modern identity in the Indian subcontinent and omnipresent
in the regional consciousness. While Partition was horrific and seared into many
memories in South Asia, what truly continues to haunt today’s world is the legacy of
Partition. The fears, suspicions, and hatreds forged through the vicious carnage continue
to haunt the region. Leaders on both sides would blame each other for, at best, not doing
enough to contain the violence, and at worst, encouraging it. This distrust would persist,
45

exacerbating the regional conflicts and growing pains of two young nations, each eager to
establish themselves on the world stage, until it would bring the two countries to the
brink of a war less than a year later, and many times after that. Many characterize the
subcontinent’s current problems as part of postcolonial dynamics, and while this does
cause a significant proportion of the troubles, Partition’s legacy caused Pakistan to
develop a deep seated paranoia about India’s ability to snuff out Pakistan’s existence.
Certainly, this sentiment was the more powerful of the two. And in 1948 especially,
Pakistan, almost drowning under the never-ending waves of refugees and a collapsing
government and economy, there was a sense that the country could not survive. The
unresolved existential insecurity that Pakistan has suffered since Partition because of the
“Indian threat,” and Pakistan and India’s rising religious nationalism, pose a legitimate
threat to not only regional, but global, stability.
While much of the paranoia was just that, leaders on both sides had reason to
believe that the other side might be winking at genocide. In the case of Partition violence,
political elites hold significant responsibility in, firstly, creating the conditions for
horrific sectarian violence, and secondly, encouraging it. The creation of conditions came
from the very top: Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Mahatma Gandhi, and Jawarlal Nehru. These
men chose to stir up religious frenzy for political gain and their personal egos. The
encouragement of violence typically did not come from the highest echelons of the Indian
National Congress or All India Muslim League, but still did arise from political officials
within the parties. Sikhs were also encouraged to attack Muslims by their leaders, but for
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the purposes of this case study, that is not the primary focus given that they were not part
of a nationalist movement.
Political elites manipulated religious
loyalties to create nationalist ties. Religious
animosity had always existed, exacerbated by
decades of colonial rule and the British’s ageold “divide and rule” stratagem.63 The British
had spent decades defining communities strictly
and attaching political representation to them,
politicizing and worsening religious difference.
Gandhi was able to play on these stark religious
divides to build a following as early as the
1920s. The Muslim League picked up a similar
strategy after the 1937 elections, using identity
markers to shape a nationalist Muslim identity.
Credit: The Hindu Archive

The value of Partition as a case study in

Figure 7: Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohammad Ali Jinnah

collective violence is that by mapping its
history, we are able to uncover how political elites are able to create civilian led violence
without a direct call to violence and explore how collective violence can be inspired by
nationalist ideology rather than just ethnic or religious strife. Although we must also
recognize, as with previous cases, that identity doubtless also played a foundational role.
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The Sikhs retained a historical fear of Muslim domination. Historical truths had
power amongst the Sikhs, who adhered to a martially-defined faith, and many of their
founding myths were dominated by Muslim oppression of their gurus.64 Mughal rule
from 1526 to 1857 only reinforced Sikh fears of Muslim domination, and so with
Partition nearing, Sikhs were not in favor of a Muslim separatist movement creating a
divide in their home state. Since then, thousands of Sikhs trained and fought in World
War II, and many of them retained their uniforms and weapons. This is to say, within the
biggest state being divided by Partition, a uniformed army lay in wait, ready to mobilize
at the slightest provocation. Muhammad Ali Jinnah seemed to be perfectly happy to
provide that provocation.
Jinnah, by nature, was a moderate nationalist. In the early part of the twentieth
century, Jinnah was a member of the Congress party and a staunch supporter of
League/Congress unity. Initially, he was not a separatist. He generally held disdain for
the dangerous religious frenzy that he thought had confused Indian politics and
endangered the independence movement. Jinnah eventually resigned from the Congress
for this reason once Gandhi took over. Jinnah privately hoped that the parting would be
temporary, but was worried about Gandhi’s methods, the religious frenzy he created, and
the religious militancy of the Muslims he attracted.65 Jinnah found Gandhi to be
dangerously sectarian. He would frame his political arguments in religious terms, framing
the need for an independent India in the words of Hindu fables. He talked of “Ram
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Rajya,” a mythical ideal state of government under the god Ram.66 Jinnah found this talk
to be little more than theatrics, an appeal to emotion. However, Jinnah worried about
inflaming Muslims more than he did Hindus. Mullahs across the subcontinent were
threatening to launch a jihad movement against the British to support the Khilafat67 in
Turkey. This “Khilafat” movement attracted what Jinnah considered to be fanatics and
rough edged Muslims.68 Jinnah was certain that this rage would inevitably turn from the
British to Hindus. However, Gandhi did not have the same concerns. Needing Muslim
votes to launch his Satyagraha movement, he threw his support behind the Khilafat
movement.
Jinnah’s desire to unite Muslims and work with Congress was clearer in 1935,
with the discussion around the 1935 Act.69 The British were relying on this Act to
strengthen Britain’s hold over India, and so the Congress and the League had a common
interest in breaking up the provincial system of inter-regional politics upon which the
British depended. Jinnah stressed the importance of Muslim unity in this moment—if the
Muslims were able to form a solid voting bloc, they would be able to transform
themselves from a group perpetually on the margins to a group that the Congress would
have to bargain with. It was in this moment that it crystallized that Muslims, regardless of
66

Patrick French, Liberty or Death: India's Journey to Independence and Division (Random House
LLC, 2016), 39.
67 The Khilafat movement was a pan-Islamist political protest campaign launched by Muslims of
British India to restore the caliph of the Ottoman Caliphate, who was considered the leader of
Sunni Muslims, as an effective political authority. The importance of this was is
represented/supported a Muslim identity that was above conflict or issues of nationalism.
68
Hajari, Midnight's Furies, 27.
69The Government of India Act 1935 was an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Salient
Features of the Government of India Act 1935 were as follows: abolition of provincial dyarchy and
introduction of dyarchy at the center, abolition of Indian Council and introduction of an advisory
body in its place, provision for an All India Federation with British India territories and princely
states, elaborate safeguards and protective instruments for minorities, supremacy of British
Parliament.

49

political views or background, had to fall in line behind a single leader.70 Although it was
not immediately clear at the outset, it was Jinnah who would fill this role. Ayesha Jalal
convincingly makes the case that “Jinnah is not only a rather unorthodox Muslim, but
also a ‘sole spokesman,’ a nationalist in quest of his nation. For him, Islam provided the
cultural basis for an ideology of ethnic nationalism to mobilize the Muslim majority to
defend the ‘minoritarian Muslims’”.71
The 1937 elections marked an important turning point. The League was forced to
adopt a new line after being rebuffed by the Congress and suffering a humiliating defeat
in the elections.72 The elections had made it clear that the League did not have popular
support and their goal in 1935 for Muslims to unite behind a single leader and slogan had
become irrelevant. In a bid to speak for the Muslims of India, in 1940 the League
formally demanded a separate Muslim state. This was Jinnah’s decision, coming from his
desire to speak for all Indian Muslims, not just Muslims in the minority provinces where
the League had achieved their success in the 1937 elections, but also the Muslims in
provinces where they had been unequivocally rejected.
This was the beginning of the League’s successful movement to create a new
Muslim identity and to serve as its spokespersons. As mentioned earlier, they began to
use identity markers to forge a new nationalist Muslim identity.73 Core to the
manipulation of cultural symbols was not only Islam, but Urdu as a linguistic identity.
The ideologues of the Muslim League worked hard to present this as the language for
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Muslims, even though it was almost indistinguishable from Hindi as a spoken language.
This clearly indicates an important pattern in nation-building, in that the initial Pakistani
identity was not inherent, but a construction. The mobilization of these identity markers
helped Muslim separatism to gain a foothold, at the same time as the Congress was using
symbols like the sacred cow to create a Hindu nationalist frenzy.
Jinnah’s decision to pursue Partition ruffled feathers all around, from other
Muslim leaders to Congress leaders to the British, but perhaps the most dangerous was
the Sikh frustration that ensued.74 As early as January 1939, a British intelligence report
predicted that “the Sikhs to a man would fight literally to the death rather than to submit
to Muslim domination.”75 Punjab was a powder keg ready to explode as it was, with all
parties seriously preparing for a civil war, but the most serious were the Sikh activities by
far.76 The violence that ensued had been organized and ordered from the highest levels of
Sikh leadership.77 Jinnah, in his desire to seize political control of Punjab, pushed his
followers to organize and demonstrate. The disobedience movement grew as days passed,
and protesters became more and more bold. Jinnah ignored the warnings that protests
were in danger of becoming violent and continued to push his supporters to continue to
protest. Unsurprisingly, they did turn violent, and as they did, Hindus and Sikhs grew
more resentful and more frustrated. Tara Singh, who occupied the highest levels of Sikh
leadership, pushed Sikhs to form fighting units. This was a key moment in which Jinnah
pushed aside caution in a moment of ego and defensive nation-building and created the
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perfect conditions for later massacres. The Sikhs should never have been provoked and
threatened.
There were several key moments that led to the massacres in 1946, apart from the
religious/nationalist frenzy that leaders created with their charged rhetoric. Jinnah’s
establishment as the “sole spokesman” for all Muslims was one of these, as was his
subsequent disillusionment with the Congress. Jinnah’s transformation from moderate
nationalist to a man who was willing to use religion to achieve his political aims was
perhaps the most important moment in terms of Partition violence. Of course, without
him, there would be no Partition, but even if there was, Muslims might not have engaged
in the violence or provoked Hindus and Sikhs in the ways that did. There would have
been violence anyway, on account of ethnic strife that had been ongoing for decades, but
probably not to the same degree. Jinnah’s new line was that the Hindu dominated
Congress could not be trusted and would put Islam in danger, and Muslims needed their
own nation. This message worked. Pirs (term used to describe spiritual guides in the Sufi
faith) were attracted to the promise of their own nation and attracted Muslim masses to
the League. The Hindus had had a movement inciting religious frenzies since 1915, the
Sikhs had been historically threatened by Muslims, and now the Muslims had a united
political movement based on religion and separatism.
Each side had cause to fight, and very soon, each side also had uniformed fanatics
and provocations towards mob rule. The 1946 Calcutta Killings78 was the first massacre
after which Nehru and Jinnah might have become aware of what was to follow. However,
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the path of violence was not inevitable. The Calcutta Killings happened on the 16th of
August, 1946. The next bout of violence was in Noakhali, months later. As isolated
incidents, these were not particularly worrying, especially since they seemed confined to
the subcontinent’s eastern corner. However, Muslim propogandists showed up across
India’s northern provinces with photographs of corpses and charred pages of the Qur’an
that they claimed Hindus had burnt in Bihar and Calcutta. League officials in Punjab
were already stockpiling weapons and recruiting Muslim university students for
“underground secret work.”79
Noakhali created a huge boost for
Hindu militants’ members numbers.
As the uproar around it increased, the
police noticed that the Hindu
Mahasabha and other orthodox Hindu
parties, which previously “had very

Credit: Margaret Bourke-White, GETTY IMAGES

little following or political influence,”

Figure 8: A convoy of Sikhs migrating to East Punjab in
October, 1947.

were coming “out into the open and… rallying Hindus all over the country to fight
Islam.” Tales of Hindu women being violated by Muslim men were a powerful recruiting
tool.80
It was in this tense setting that Jinnah was encouraging his followers to create a
disobedience movement in Punjab, and in this environment that he ignored warnings that
protests might turn bloody.81 Khizar’s government in Punjab banned all demonstrations

79

Hajari, Midnight's Furies, 64.
Hajari, Midnight's Furies, 58.
81
Hajari, Midnight's Furies, 72, 74, 81.
80

53

in the province, but it was too late. And anyway, Jinnah had been Khizar’s foe for years,
fighting for political control of Punjab, and this mandate, if anything, provided more
incentive for the disobedience movement.82 Now it would serve as a means to settle a
personal vendetta as well as gain political control. Is it any surprise that 1946 saw dozens
of massacres in Punjab, and in 1947, when refugees would try to cross the Punjabi
border, they would be witness to a horrific mutual genocide?

Historical Myths, Patriotism, and Nationalism
In this environment, and against the backdrop of years of fierce political
arguments, it is not surprising that there was some distrust and animosity between the
new leaders of India and Pakistan. Pakistan held a deep fear that India would try and
destroy the state before it even got a chance to exist. This was not wholly surprising.
India, at many points, refused to give Pakistan the funding or supplies that were
promised. Gandhi’s hunger strike,
right before his assassination, was
on the grounds that India was
trying to starve her sister state
into submission by not handing
over the 550 million rupees that
Credit: The Hindu Archive

Pakistan had been promised.

Figure 9: Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Mahatma Gandhi

Without the threat of Gandhi
starving, it is not clear that the money would ever have been handed over. And even
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though Gandhi did not starve to death, his hunger strike did eventually kill him. To Hindu
and Sikh extremists, the only outcome of the hunger strike was a richer Pakistan. And so,
on the 30th of January 1948, Nathuram Vinayak Godse, an editor of a Hindu nationalist
newspaper and a member of the nationalist political party, the Hindu Mahasabha and
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh,83 shot Gandhi three times at point blank range.
Unfortunately, the idea that India hoped to “strangle” the new state of Pakistan
developed a permanent hold over the consciousness of Pakistanis. It was no longer a
suspicion held by top government officials but a widely held belief across class and
occupational divides. This animosity and fear came out most clearly over the Kashmir
question. By November 1949, UN mapmakers drew a ceasefire line in Kashmir that
would eventually develop into the Line of Control that still stands. The idea that
Pakistanis must defy their neighbor for the country’s survival became a national mission
and, according to a visiting journalist, seemed to be the “cement that holds Pakistan
together.”84 Any compromise on Kashmir seemed impossible, and Nehru did not help
with compromise. He offered
few concessions on Kashmir
during his tenure as prime
minister. This was not
surprising, given Nehru’s
Credit: Rich Clabaugh/Staff

strange and romantic obsession

Figure 10: Map of Pakistan/India border and Kashmir, showing
the Line of Control

Neena Vyas, “RSS Releases `proof’ of Its Innocence,” The Hindu, August 18, 2004, sec.
NATIONAL, https://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/rss-releases-proof-of-itsinnocence/article27655353.ece. Exact dates of his membership are unknown.
84
Hajari, Midnight's Furies, 256.
83

55

with Kashmir. In a letter to Edwina Mountbatten he described his feelings for Kashmir as
“a mild intoxication.”85 But Kashmir to India was much more than just one man’s dream.
Kashmir became the stage for a powerful morality play. If the predominantly Muslim
kingdom of Kashmir chose to join a predominantly Hindu nation, Nehru would be able to
deal a fatal blow to Jinnah’s ideology. A victory in Kashmir was symbolic, it meant a
national triumph of one sister state over another.
India could afford a stalemate—it started out on better footing and had a larger
economy and more stable institutions. Nehru’s tenure in office for a decade and a half
and his emphasis on centralized planning gave India a stability that Pakistan would never
achieve after Jinnah’s death in 1948. After Jinnah’s death, a series of weak leaders took
their turns trying to govern. All the troubles that Jinnah had brushed aside or held at bay
flared up. This, in turn, led to more religious rhetoric. Unworthy political leaders, trying
to restore their ability to govern and silence opposition, continued to push the idea that
Islam was a threat.86 Regional tensions, class resentments, various social and political
divides stalled government progress and held the door wide open for the Pakistani army
to walk in.
The military was by far the most powerful and competent institution in Pakistan,
and the most well-funded. The military had been resentful over how the civilian
government halted fighting in Kashmir and had been vying for control since 1951. Seven
years later, a second attempt succeeded, this time led by General Ayub Khan. This
marked the beginning of a long string of military leaders. The dominance of the army
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required a justification, and they kept trying to create one: incompetent civil leaders,
ethnic strife, regional tensions. In the end, the most effective one was the Indian threat.
The Pakistani army elevated the threat from their neighbor to explain the need for the
military to lead. It led to a horrific cycle and a self-fulfilling prophecy. The army’s
misadventures led to heightened tensions with India, India would humiliate Pakistan on
the battlefield, and the Pakistani army would then find more excuses to engage to regain
national honor. Their string of losses meant that Pakistani leaders, once again turned to
Islam as a rallying cry. Pakistan’s secular elite struck a bargain with Pakistan’s mullahs
to promote religious fervor and antipathy towards India as a means to unite Pakistanis
behind military leaders. In this way, in Pakistan’s formative years, leaders from
politicians to civil servants to the military, used Islam to define an identity for Pakistan.
Even those who did not actively push this accepted Islam as a politico-military strategic
doctrine.

Current Relevance: Legacy Formation as A Motivator for The Kashmir Conflict
In the 1980s, this dynamic intensified under Dictator Zia ul-Haq. He embarked on
a policy called Islamization, funding madrassas, regulating education to include more
Islamic learning, and rewarding devout officers. He also began Pakistan’s path of
sponsoring extremist militants like the Afghan jihadists and the Lakshar-i-Taliban to
conduct proxy wars in order to establish itself strategically on the world stage. The use of
these unpredictable forces that Pakistan does not have to answer for have, unsurprisingly,
soured relations even further with India. The extremist militants also very quickly spun
out of Pakistan’s control, developing into a considerable force in their own right, capable
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of causing problems for Pakistan and the world at large. The tensions between India and
Pakistan do nothing positive for either party, limiting trade and creating unnecessary
military tensions, but both sides continue to stoke nationalist frenzy for political gain.
What the military has done in Pakistan, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh has
done in India. The RSS is dedicated to the propagation of “Hindutva,” the idea that India
is a nation for Hindus, above all else. While Nehru and Gandhi laid the groundwork of a
nationalist Hindu ideology, they were still committed to a secular state. By 1947
standards, the RSS is an extremist party. It was popularized as the Nehru-Gandhi family
dynasty and the Congress lost popularity and were cast as out of touch and nepotist. The
RSS’s political branch, the Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP, found support primarily
through nationalist stunts to stir religious passions.87 Even with the downfall of the
Congress and the uptick in Hindu nationalism, the BJP did not quite grab the national
spotlight until Narendra Modi became the central figure.88
Modi is, and always has been, explicitly and defiantly anti-Muslim. In 2002, when
he was the Chief Minister of the Gujarati government, he did not stop the Gujarat Muslim
massacres. In fact, as he received (limited) backlash, he led a Hindu pride march through
Gujarat, calling the state’s Muslims schemers, and an obstacle to overcome.89 Modi can
play on the hateful legacy of Partition. Many believe that India’s Muslims are terrorists
and want the downfall of the state—Modi became a hero for Indians who felt threatened.
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Modi knew what all Indian leaders before him: the instrumentalization of “vicious
sectarian rhetoric, the country’s leader could persuade Hindus to give him nearly
unchecked power.”90 Modi’s actions during the Gujarat massacres led him to the Prime
Minister’s office. The riot’s victims were predominantly Muslim and led to Muslims
being pushed into slums. Besides allowing the killings to continue, Modi also gained
politically. He was able to tap into “historic resentments about the nation’s former
Mughal rulers and prejudices harbored by many Hindus—namely, that Muslims receive
special treatment and support terrorism.”91 Modi’s popularity that won him the Prime
Minister’s office was transparently because of, and on the backs of, dead Muslims.
Why does the legacy of Partition matter? The animosity that Partition created, that
leaders have stoked and hardened, directly causes current violence throughout the
subcontinent. Pakistan’s use of extremist militants has destabilized the country, which in
turn destabilizes the region and the world, especially when considering Pakistan’s
growing stockpile of nuclear weapons. Pakistan continues to fund and support the
Lashkar-i-Taliban, even with the emergence of the Pakistani Taliban, a group dedicated
to overthrowing the Pakistani government and that has successfully carried out terrorist
attacks on army bases, Inter-Services Intelligence headquarters and airports. These
terrorist forces, with and without government sanction, wage a proxy war in Kashmir,
provoking Indian forces and an Indian government that does not need provocation to take
extreme measures. Modi’s government, and its emphasis on Hindutva, allows Muslims to
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be killed by mobs all over the country, and in August 2019, revoked Article 37092, and
occupied Kashmir. The Indian government deployed its forces on all street corners, shut
down internet and telephone services, regional leaders were placed under house arrest,
and tourists were told to leave.
In the same month, the government created a citizenship registry in Assam,
rendering thousands of Muslims stateless, and announced a plan to open detention centers
for Muslims. In December, the Indian government passed the Citizenship Amendment
Act (CAA), a law that creates a path to citizenship for immigrants of different faiths
except Muslims. The law,
although unsurprising, marks an
important legislative separation in
the identities of “Indian” and
“Muslim.” This is more deeply
pernicious than many realize. A
deeper look at the list of
Credit: Adnan Abidi / Reuters

immigrants reveals the larger point
Modi’s government is trying to

Figure 11: Peaceful protesters against the new citizenship law
are met with force in every case

make. The bill pretends to support minorities from South Asia- but it only accepts
minorities (except Muslims) from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan. It is not open
to immigrants from countries like Sri Lanka, China, and Myanmar, even though Sri
Lanka has a large group of persecuted Hindus in need of protection (Tamils). Pakistan,

92Article

370 of the Indian constitution gave special status to Jammu and Kashmir—conferring it
with the power to have a separate constitution, a state flag and autonomy over the internal
administration of the state.
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Bangladesh, and Afghanistan are officially Muslim countries, while China, Sri Lanka,
and Myanmar are not. In choosing which nationalities to allow, the Indian government
has set up Islam as the oppressor. Only minorities from Muslim countries are in need of
Indian support.93 Unlike Indian actions in Kashmir and Assam, this led to widespread
protests. Indians took to the streets to protest the legislation. The protests went on for
months, and in February of 2020, protests over the CAA triggered mob violence across
Delhi. Hindu mobs chanted “Jai Shri Ram,” a BJP slogan that translates as “Glory to
Lord Ram,”94 as they went on a rampage through Delhi, attacking and killing Muslims
and destroying property. Police officers stood idly by, no doubt instructed not to
intervene, and in many cases joined in. One video caught cops smashing CCTV cameras,
while another showed them helping men gather stones to throw.95 For context, when
Muslim protesters at Jamia University got “unruly,” the police stormed the university and
arrested students. The Delhi police are controlled by the Home Ministry, which is run by
Amit Shah, Modi’s closest advisor and the second most powerful man in India. Shah has
run into trouble in the past for ordering extra-judicial killings. His investigation, pushed
by renowned Indian journalist Rana Ayyub,96 came to a halt when a series of judges were
pressured by the Modi government to drop the charges.97
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Like in Gujarat in 2002, Modi watched as Delhi burned. As Hindu nationalists,
many members of his party, killed Muslims and his police force did not stop them, Modi
served Donald Trump gold-leafcrusted mandarin oranges at the
Presidential Palace.98 This was,
however, unsurprising. Months of
peaceful protests by Muslims were
met with tear gas, house raids,
arbitrary detentions, police
Credit: Danish Siddiqui / Reuters

brutality, and Internet shutdowns.

Figure 12: People supporting the new citizenship law beat a
Muslim man while police watch.

Modi’s colleagues suggested in

speeches that the protesters should be shot. A BJP politician named Kapil Mishra gave an
ultimatum to the police: clear the roads of protesters or allow his followers to do so. The
BJP’s party line, stoking ethnic animosity, calling for force, labeling opponents “traitors”
gives Hindu nationalists the confidence to incite violence and the assurance that they will
never be punished. And they are right to be assured, the Indian government has turned a
blind eye to Muslim lynching for years. The pattern of political elites creating ideal
conditions for violence has simply intensified in the twenty-first century. Nehru and
Jinnah may be at blame for starting the trend, but they did not explicitly call for violence.
And it goes on, the Pakistani government makes questionable security decisions
based on a historical insecurity, and the Indian government does not acknowledge
Muslims as Indians. A pattern emerges. The spiral of historical animosity worsens and
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intensifies. In India, the BJP have been rewriting school textbooks, erasing India’s
significant Islamic history. But even without a concerted effort to rewrite textbooks,
Pakistan and India’s students are not learning a similar history. History textbooks reflect
national sentiments, with wars being blamed squarely on the other country and opposing
views being villainized. Bollywood films are increasingly Islamophobic. Mughal history
is villainized. There are calls to demolish the Taj Mahal.99
The history that the next generation of Pakistanis and Indians are learning reflects
age old historical myths, and further reinforces the furies of Partition.100 But even if
education worked to uncover the truth, in countries with a majority of the population
being illiterate, political elites can sell any story. This was made clear with Modi’s
reelection campaign, heavily reliant on fake stories and propaganda. In the same way that
political elites in Pakistan and India have intentionally and historically worked to divide
and win, it will take a few leaders to have the courage to bridge the divide. But political
courage has been lacking for decades, and does not seem to be on the horizons, even as
the subcontinent seems to be steadily moving towards a tipping point.
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Violence as a Result of Colonial Rule: Rwandan Genocide
“Where does evil come from?
what do you mean “where”
from a human being
always a human being
and only a human being”
“Unde malum?” by Joanna Trzeciak

Hutu Disenfranchisement and Group Fractures Under Belgian Rule
On April 7, 1994, the Hutu majority of Rwanda turned on the Tutsi minority in a
wave of violence that swept the country and left almost a million people dead. Lasting
only about 100 days, the Rwandan genocide is one of the quickest and most unthinkable
waves of violence in history. Within hours of the airplane carrying the Hutu president,
Juvenal Habyarimana, being shot down, the killing had started. Elite government forces
and the Hutu militia, the Interahamwe, rounded up Tutsi military and political leaders and
executed them. Roadblocks were set up to identify Rwandans whose official IDs marked
them as Tutsi (a policy introduced in the 1930s by the Belgian colonial authorities).101
People were murdered enmasse in churches, homes, fields, and checkpoints. In rural
areas, where Hutus and Tutsis were neighbors, friends, and inter-married, government
propaganda was a call to arms.
What makes the Rwandan genocide so unthinkable is its popular and intimate
nature. None of the other case studies constitute a genocide, they are massacres. Having a
genocide be part of collective action, and civilian led, is far more confusing than pogroms
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or massacres. A genocide is an attempt to wipe out a people. The Holocaust was
conducted by a few people, even though many were complicit, and it was a form of
institutionalized violence. The killing camps were relatively removed from the view of
civilians, and Nazis often just had to press a button to operate gas chambers. The
Rwandan genocide, by contrast, was carried out by friends and neighbors, and the most
popular weapon was a machete. It takes several hacks of a machete to kill a person,
perhaps one of the most “intimate” acts of violence possible. The Rwandan genocide
would not have succeeded without hundreds of thousands of perpetrators, and millions of
complicit witnesses. Long standing interethnic ties should limit, not facilitate,
participation in mass violence, but the Rwandan genocide throws that theory to the
wind.102
The violence of the
genocide had to be the result
of both planning and
participation. The agenda was
undoubtedly proposed from
above, but deeply resonated
with perspectives from below,
and it was the combination
that created the horrific

Credit: David Turnley/Corbis, via Getty Images
Figure 13: Thousands of abandoned machetes at the border
between Rwanda and Tanzania. Hutu refugees were allowed
to cross on the condition they left behind their weapons.

reality. The popular violence would have been sporadic and disjointed without guidance
from above, and the call to violence from above would have gone unanswered without
102
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the support from below. And it is the support from below, and its popularity, that is the
disturbing part of the genocide. Similarly, to the Hindu/Muslim violence from the past
chapter, the genocide was not just a state aspect. It tapped into real historical grievances.
These historical grievances can be explained by exploring the legacy of colonialism and
postcolonial politics.
The urge to destroy an enemy is understandable, but the question is: how does the
enemy come to be defined? In the Rwandan context, the Tutsi minority came to be
defined as alien. The Tutsi minority came to be seen as a settler population, almost
analogous with the Belgian colonists. The elimination of the settlers by the natives, the
Hutus, is easier to understand because it is a violence perpetrated by victims. Yesterday’s
victims become tomorrow’s perpetrators. Frantz Fanon demonstrates this point in his
suggestion that native violence as a response to prior violence, more as violence to end
violence, rather than the perpetuation of a cycle of continued fresh violence.103
The key aspect of the Rwandan genocide (and the Holocaust) is race branding.104
To explain this, Mahmood Mamdani’s analysis is important. Race branding not only
allows a population to easily define and “other” a population, but also to exterminate it
with an easy conscience. To understand how this race branding came to be, it is crucial to
think through the political systems that colonialism set up. Colonialism created a binary
settler/native dynamic. The colonial context defined Tutsis as a group with a privileged
relationship to power. The post-colonial political context then constructed them as a
privileged alien settler presence through the revolution of 1959 and then through Hutu
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Power propaganda after 1990.105 Even though neighbors were killing neighbors, the
genocide was constructed as a cleansing of foreigners rather than neighbors.
German rule began in 1898, and simultaneous to their entry was the entry of the
Catholic Church. The White Fathers tried to establish good relations with the leadership,
hoping that if they converted, the population would follow. Yuhi Musinga, the new
mwami (king), was hostile to them and only granted them land under German pressure.106
After Germany’s defeat in World War I, the Belgians took over the region that includes
modern day Rwanda and Burundi, and, unlike the Germans, immediately began exerting
pressures on the mwami. They were highly impressed with the strict social hierarchy they
found and began to take steps to make it into a clear political hierarchy. The mwami
oscillated between being cooperative and hostile, and so the Belgians deposed him.
It was Belgian colonial reform from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s that
constructed Hutus as indigenous Bantu and Tutsi as alien Hamites. Part of this
construction was the colonial discourse of the Hamitic hypothesis, which posits that all
civilization in Africa is a foreign import. Mamdani argues that both Hutu and Tutsi are
political identities.107 If a person’s inclusion in the state and their rights are dependent on
their race or ethnicity, then their race or ethnicity is a central defining characteristic. In
this way, race and ethnicity are also political identities.
Colonialism presents itself as a civilizing project, and with colonialism, civilizing
means modernizing which means Westernizing. Tutsis, in line with the Hamitic
hypothesis, were understood within this framework as more civilized, and the colonial
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authorities cast them as more Westernized, which eventually led to them being
considered more alien. The idea that the Tutsi were superior because they were alien, that
there were racial differences between them and the local population, was a colonial
implant. Belgians, Germans, and the English were convinced that wherever there was
evidence of “civilized life,” the ruling groups could not have been indigenous. Scholars
have largely disagreed on how best to categorize Hutu and Tutsi, but Mamdani argues
that there is no single definition. Hutu and Tutsi, as primarily political identities, have
shifted over the years just as state projects have. Yet across the colonial and postcolonial
periods Tutsi and Hutu were set up as bipolar identities. The social degradation of the
Hutu was partly to blame for this. The Tutsi identity often absorbed successful Hutu into
their ranks. To be born Tutsi was to be either born into power or to be born power
adjacent, whereas to be born Hutu became to be born more and more like a subjected
underclass.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the identities had clearly become divided
along political lines. And so, in precolonial Rwanda, Hutu/Tutsi was subject/power
oriented, and then the colonial state racialized the difference to be indigenous/alien. Also,
while Hutu continued to be disproportionately present at the lower levels of society, there
was a new (but small) amount of social mobility, which would be important in the
postcolonial context. Colonialism took an already skewed power dynamic and made it
resonant with colonial power and subjugation, rather than just local dynamics.108 This
switch made the group relations more explosive than ever before.
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On some level, racialization was an intellectual construct, with very little basis in
reality. However, the colonial authorities made efforts to establish it as an institutional
construct as well. The institutional racial privilege reproduced the racial ideology. This
joint intellectual and institutional process was conducted by the colonial state and the
Catholic Church.109 The Church, in 1902, hailed the Tutsi as “supreme humans,” and “a
European under a black skin,” in 1917.110 The difference was primarily institutionalized
through a series of administrative reforms from 1927 to 1936. Key institutions, such as
education, state administration, taxation, and the Church, were organized around an
acknowledgement of different Rwandan identities. The reform was clinched with a
census that classified the entire population as Tutsi, Hutu or Twa (indigenous Rwandan
minority), and then each person was issued an identification card proclaiming their
official identities. These cards would later be used to filter Tutsi and execute them.
The school system was a space in which the perpetuation of the racial ideology
became a priority. The Western-style schools that opened in Rwanda were primarily
administered by the Church—the objective was to turn the Tutsi into an elite population
capable of being auxiliaries to the Church and the colonial administration. The schools
tended to restrict education to mainly Tutsi, and when both Tutsi and Hutu were
admitted, there was a very different education given to each. The Tutsi were given a
superior education, usually in French, and this assimilationist approach prepared them for
administrative positions, and more generally, for their citizenship. The Hutu were taught
in Kiswahili and this underlined the fact that educated Hutu were not destined for
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common citizenship. Tutsi supremacy was not only established in the colonial hierarchy,
but also Christianized. Access to Church positions were restricted to the Tutsi elite, even
while the evangelism was directed mainly at the Hutu peasantry. While schools pushed a
racial ideology, state administration racialized local authorities. Again, the Church
pushed for Tutsi supremacy in local administration. The reforms of the 1920s saw the
Tutsification of the chiefship as an institution. Local Hutu chiefs were systematically
deposed and replaced by Tutsi chiefs that had gone to schools for the sons of Tutsi chiefs.
These new chiefs had been educated on the basis of Hamitic supremacy, and felt it was
their birthright. Their chiefships were further strengthened by judicial reforms in 1936
that further centralized their power. The judicial reforms meant that chiefs were often
able to sit in judgement of themselves, effectively creating local despots.
Even though the Hutu peasantry was primarily involved in agriculture and the
Belgian colonial government made a lot of agrarian reforms, the Hutu peasantry
experienced a harsh Belgian rule. This was partly due to the aforementioned Tutsification
of local authorities. Tutsi chiefs were able to simply appropriate the wages of their
laborers, while those laborers were still responsible for paying their monetary taxes. The
colonial administration also instituted arbitrary exactions that it mandated, and the
punishments for reneging on these requirements (forced labor/crops), was getting hit
repeatedly with a cane. Forced labor, particularly, was a key mode of exploitation. The
colonial authorities would pass on every developmental requirement, like the upkeep of
infrastructure, to chiefs, who would use their authority to force the Hutu peasantry to
perform the task without payment. The regime of forced labor continued to expand—
chiefs began to demand more and more days of forced and unpaid labor as a “land tax,”
70

and soon began to add requirements like the free construction of their houses. While the
Tutsi were undoubtedly complicit in a multilayered system of Hutu oppression, the
Belgians enforced the system. Tutsi authorities were often forced to whip the Hutu and
force them to work, under the threat of getting whipped themselves. Even then, Tutsi
chiefs had significant agency and were in a profitable partnership, able to exact additional
resources from the Hutu to line their pockets.
All these measures depend on the classification of Hutu and Tutsi, and the
Belgians achieved this rigid classification with the census of 1933. The criteria are widely
debated—one measure was to categorize those with more than ten cows as Tutsi and
those with less as Hutu. It is impossible that this was applied in every case, not only
because it is mathematically improbable, but also because not all Tutsi owned more than
ten cows. Mamdani argues that the ten cow rule was probably used more to identify
Hutu, and not Tutsi.111 This meant that rich Hutu were, once again, somewhat absorbed
into the ranks of the Tutsi. The administration also relied on the Church for demographic
information, and the Church differentiated between Hutu and Tutsi based on physical
measurement and ownership of a large herd of cows. The Church had the opportunity to
institutionalize the Hamitic hypothesis and the Belgian administration the opportunity to
take a real socioeconomic distinction and racialize it.
Once they became legal identities the past social rise from Hutu to Tutsi or fall
from Tutsi to Hutu was no longer possible. For the first time, these categories became
permanent identities. This system was upheld by a regime of Tutsi privilege. The
administrative regime was Tutsi dominated. Poor Tutsi were exempt from the unfair
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exaction regime, and rich Tutsi explicitly profited off it, cementing the idea that to be
born Tutsi was to be associated with power. And so, in summary: Tutsi was first cast as
an identity of power through the ennoblement of prosperous individuals through
marriage. Then, colonial rule doubled down on the power/subject dynamic framed by the
Hamitic hypothesis. The Belgian authorities and the Church racialized the divide, making
it into a settler/native dynamic in which Tutsi were made to be a nonindigenous identity.

The Legacy of the Victim/Perpetrator Cycle
In the post-colonial phase, the fortunes of the Tutsi changed. Because the Hutu
and Tutsi had become synonymous with an indigenous majority and alien minority under
colonial rule, the decolonization movement relied on the empowerment of the indigenous
majority against the alien minority. The main causes of the 1959 Revolution had their
roots in colonial changes. The Belgian move not only made the Tutsi a nonindigenous
identity, it also definitively consolidated Tutsi privilege in a way that led Tutsi of all
socioeconomic levels to absorb privilege. This meant that the Tutsi embraced their
identity as nonindigenous—their position as nonindigenous Hamites was the foundation
of their privileged positions. Even while colonial rule made the state apparatus
increasingly rigid by reducing social mobility, its introduction of a monetized economy
and school-based education eventually led to the creation of a Hutu elite. This meant that
there was an educated elite that felt permanently trapped in a subordinate legal status and
so developed into a powerful political counter elite, committed to the overthrow of the
current social order. The Hutu counter elite was perfectly positioned to tap into the
frustrations of the Hutu peasantry over local despotism and coerced labor.
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Hutu labor migrants, to escape coerced labor, often found themselves in the
Congo and Uganda. Both destinations had new thriving postwar markets for minerals,
coffee, and sugar.112 These migrants often experienced a new social order, leading them
to the fresh realization that the Tutsi despotism in Rwanda was unjust. Many of the early
protest leaders were former migrant workers, who now had economic security and a
social network, making it easy to politically organize and mobilize. This, coupled with
the rise of the school-based Western education system, led to the erosion of the social
supremacy of the Tutsi, even though the political supremacy was left intact. The cattle
based wealth of the Tutsi elite was still untouched, but the Belgians encouraged Hutus to
grow crops for export, giving them access to the money economy via their cash crops,
weakening the colonial bonds of pastoral servitude. In this context, education had a
charged impact on the Hutu that were able to access it. The school system’s merit based
system led to the foundation of egalitarian ideas. It was still, however, heavily based on
the Hamitic hypothesis and the school system still operated by giving Tutsi access to a
French education and Hutu access to the Kiswahili education. While very few Hutu
managed to access secondary education, the ones that did were struck by the injustice of
the political and economic monopoly of the Tutsi. Therefore, the push to break this
monopoly became the central aim of the Hutu intellectual elite during the revolution.
Former Hutu priests were also increasingly a part of the Hutu counter elite. While
studying for the priesthood and attempting to climb the Church hierarchy, the Tutsi
monopoly on the Church was abundantly clear. Even though the Church laid the
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foundations of the Hamitic hypothesis, Christian ideology espoused egalitarianism and
became a powerful motivator for Hutu priests.
The 1961 elections were the context in which the Hutu counter elite created a
popular nationalism from below that clashed with the Tutsi nationalism from above. Both
decried the “racial tension” at the core of their problems—one focused on the foreign
black versus white dynamic and one on the local Hamite versus Bantu (Hutu) dynamic.113
This caused the Hutu counter elite to articulate their hostility against the Hutu elite. The
clash signaled a contrast
between Tutsi power and
Hutu lack of power, and the
characterization of Tutsi
power as foreign. The
confluence of a popular
movement of frustrated Hutu
peasants and the emergence
of a Hutu counter elite
created a moment in which

Credit: Gilles Peress/Magnum Photos
Figure 14: Hutus living in this house scrawled their ethnicity on the
wall to prevent looting. They fled to escape the advance of the rebel
forces.

the Hutu could overcome their identity as subordinate and seize power. And so, became
the rallying cry: Hutu Power!
The assertiveness of the Hutu Power movement only led to a distressed and
outraged push back from the Tutsi, who had been fed a steady diet of the Hamitic
hypothesis and Tutsi supremacy. They were committed to defending colonial privilege
113
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and equating it with custom and privilege. This reaction only strengthened the Hutu
political cause. The claim that Tutsi power needed to be restored only further
strengthened the Hutu movement while discrediting the Tutsi one. The growing Hutu
counter elite brought Tutsi unity under pressure and expanded the political arena,
eventually bringing around two rival political parties: Union Nationale Rwandaise
(UNAR), conservative, and Rassemblement Democratique Rwandais (RADER),
reformist, in competition with the conservative Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation
Hutu, PARMEHUTU, and the moderate Association Pour la Promotion Sociale de la
Masse (APROMOSA). These were the limited choices that the Rwandan people faced
before the election.
The elections were marked with UNAR/PARMEHUTU militant clashes and
revolts throughout the country. The focus of the revolts were Tutsi chiefs who were killed
or forced to resign. The visiting UN Mission estimated the dead at over 200 people and
Belgium placed Rwanda in a state of emergency at the concern that Tutsi chiefs might
begin full scale Hutu repression. Before the violence could swing from anti-Tutsi to antiHutu, emergency military action by Belgium intervened with the command of Colonel
B.E.M. Guy Logiest. Arguing that Tutsi chiefs were threatening the public order, he
began to replace them with Hutu chiefs, and so began the overthrow against the colonial
power’s own local authorities. The state hierarchy suddenly became a Hutu hierarchy.
There was significant external influence in this “revolution.” European clergy acted as a
backup force for the Hutu counter elite, writing manifestos and UN petitions.114 The
colonial government handed over power to the insurgent force. And this support was
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critical, without the significant external support, it is not clear that the Hutu counter elite
would have been able to stage a revolution.
With their political power significantly reversed, the Tutsi elite splintered, some
went into political exile, some stayed home. The few left began to try to push for power
again, but the Hutu political elite was determined that the new political community
exclude Tutsi. Many believe that the beginning of the genocidal tendencies of 1994 began
in 1959. While the revolution was a bloodbath, the attempted repression that followed,
politically, gave the upper hand to the Hutu power tendency. After the revolution, the
Hutu claimed that the government represented the whole nation. But of course, in a
primarily Hutu government, the nation represented was also Hutu, which meant that the
Tutsi were disenfranchised civically. The Tutsi were removed from the political arena,
although they continued to be present in business, education, and the Church, because
they were alien. In the view of the new era, the Tutsi were not only alien, but they were
also a minority, meaning that representation for them did not matter. In addition to just
being a minority, they were a historically privileged minority—which meant that justice
in a Hutu nation looked like fixing Tutsi dominated institutions like the Church,
education, and employment to be Hutu spheres of power. The Second Republic failed to
integrate, or even try to integrate, the Tutsi diaspora into the postcolonial reality. This
integration would assume that the Tutsi were as much a part of the political community
as the Hutu.
This cycle of victims becoming perpetrators happened again with the civil war
and the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s invasion in October 1990. The RPF went in as an army
looking to liberate a people and came out of it as an army of occupation. The
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Habyarimana regime entered the
war pledged to ethnic
reconciliation, but exited the war
pledged to uphold Hutu Power.
As Hutu Power was threatened
with the RPF invasion, a
genocidal tendency was born in
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its defense. For the first time in

Figure 15: A Hutu man whose face was mutilated by the Hutu
Interahamwe militia, who suspected him of sympathizing with
the Tutsi rebels.

decades, the danger of Tutsi
Power was back, thanks to the RPF invasion. This was, at least, how the Rwandan
government explained the invasion to the Rwandan population and foreign media. They
were once again at risk of being oppressed, and so returned Hutu Power to the forefront
of politics. The threat of Tutsi Power led to a string of massacres and random killing and
pillaging of Tutsis. The enemy was initially just the political enemy that was the Tutsi,
but soon Hutu who were branded accomplices of the RPF were also targeted. In this
explosive situation, we also must remember that the war disrupted agricultural production
and the economy as a whole. This, in addition to the Arusha Accords115, resulted in a
completely polarized situation. The UN mandated that the government must implement
the Arusha Agreement, or it would be forced to pull out, isolating the Kigali government.
It was in this context that Habyarima’s plane was shot down. The murder of their
president seemed like a sign that without Hutu Power, there would only be Hutu
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servitude. And so, it became the time for Hutu to choose between power and servitude.
President Habyarima and his prime minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, represented the
middle ground of ethnic reconciliation, even as they supported Hutu Power, which had
served to obstruct those with genocidal tendencies. The genocidal tendency now had free
reign, beginning yet another cycle of victims turned perpetrators.

Current Relevance: Gacaca As the Key to Reconciliation
To break the cycle, historical memory becomes key. The genocide claimed more
than half a million lives and murdered approximately three quarters of Rwanda’s Tutsi
population in just three months. Also, as many as 250,000 women were raped, leaving the
country’s population traumatized and its infrastructure decimated. In this context, any
form of justice post-genocide seemed near impossible. But justice is what was needed to
create reconciliation between two polarized groups. Rwanda lacked not only the
infrastructure to take on the massive commitment of prosecuting the murderers, but also
lacked the lawyers and judges, as they had either been killed or fled the country. And,
given the popular nature of the genocide, there were a lot of people to prosecute. Rwanda
presents an interesting case study, especially in the context of this thesis, because the
state took a very active role in creating a legacy and reconciliation. While it was far from
perfect, it was extraordinary given the circumstances.
The main concept that is important to post-genocide justice in Rwanda is
transitional justice. Transitional justice is rooted in accountability. By putting victims and
their dignity first, it signals the way forward for a renewed commitment to make sure
ordinary citizens are safe in their own countries. Mass atrocities and systematic abuses
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devastate societies and their legacy is likely to make conditions of the country fragile:
political and legal institutions are weak, unstable, politicized, and under-resourced.116
However, while justice was an important commitment, Rwanda also had to find a way to
move forward as a united nation. Because of the unprecedented scale of civilian-oncivilian violence that had occurred, there were far more people implicated in crimes than
could be prosecuted officially.
Rwanda found a way to focus on both reconciliation and justice. Justice was
pursued in the way of gacaca courts, and through the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda117 and extradition. Justice in Rwanda was a highly controversial process, as was
inevitable considering the task the government was given.118 The new government,
headed by the RPF, adopted a stance of maximal prosecution. Each participant in the
genocide was to be prosecuted.119 This included the central planners, the coerced civilian
population, and those who were opportunistic throughout the process. They would all be
prosecuted and punished for their crimes. Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide outlined five acts that constituted genocidal
acts: (1) killing members of the group; (2) causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; (3) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (4) imposing
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measures intended to prevent births within the group; (5) forcibly transferring children of
the group to another group.120 The Rwandan genocide code of 1996 outlined four
categories of responsibility in the genocide: (1) “planners, organizers, instigators,
supervisors and leaders of the crime of genocide or of a crime against humanity,” persons
in positions of authority in the government or political parties, “notorious murderers,”
and “persons who committed acts of sexual torture”; (2) perpetrators or “conspirators of
accomplices” of intentional homicide or physical assault causing death; (3) persons guilty
of “serious assaults against the person”; and (4) persons who committed crimes against
property.121
On an international level, the UN Security Council created the ICTR. Its mandate
was to prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed between January 1, 1994, and December 31,
1994, in Rwanda or in neighboring states. The ICTR was expected to enable the
prosecution of the genocide planners who had fled the country, acknowledge the
international scope of the crimes committed in Rwanda, establish a significant repository
of testimony and evidence about the 1994 genocide, and help seek justice for genocide
survivors. The ICTR lived up to these expectations to some degree but was not an
unquestionable success. Many Rwandans felt marginalized by the ICTR in the beginning
because they were not able to access information about the proceedings. However, by the
late 1990s and early 2000s, Rwandans were able to follow the trials due to public
information campaigns. They largely followed the high profile trials, such as trials in
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which owners of the extremist, anti-Tutsi propaganda newspapers and radio were
prosecuted, and the military trials, in which several highly placed officers were
prosecuted. Many Rwandans view the institution as unjust since people prosecuted before
the ICTR face lesser penalties than those tried inside Rwanda and enjoy comparatively
luxurious prison conditions. In addition, the vast resources invested in the ICTR and its
slow progress encouraged additional criticism, and the Rwandan government did, when
politically expedient, encourage negative sentiment toward the ICTR.122
Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, several foreign governments were
involved in prosecuting Rwandans for genocide-related crimes.123 One of the important
examples was the trial of a National University of Rwanda professor and four Roman
Catholic nuns in Belgium in 2001.124 According to Human Rights Watch, the defendants
were charged with violations of humanitarian law under the Geneva Conventions and the
Belgian penal code. All were found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment. The second
trial was in Canada. Canada prosecuted Desiré Munyaneza under the domestic Crimes
Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, passed in 2000.125 Munyaneza was the son of a
wealthy Hutu shopkeeper in Butare and fled to Canada in around 1996. In 2005, he was
arrested and charged with genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. His trial
began in March 2007 and lasted over two years and cost the Canadian government
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millions of dollars.126 On the 29th of October 2009, he was sentenced to life in prison
with no chance of parole for at least 25 years. Prosecutions of other genocide suspects
continued before several European courts and the Rwandan government investigated
suspects who fled and began living abroad to request their extradition.
On a national level, the first genocide trials began in Rwanda’s Belgian-style
courts in December of 1996. The Rwandan justice system was destroyed in the genocide
and its personnel, including lawyers and judges killed, was overwhelmed and trials
moved forward at an extremely slow pace. As of March 2001, the national courts had
tried around 5,310 people.127 In the late 1990s, prison and local jail populations in
Rwanda soared to over 130,000,128 almost all prisoners were held on charges of genocide.
Any country would have struggled under the problem of trying to organize fair trials for
that many genocide suspects. Under pressure from the international community to solve
the problem, the Rwandan government turned to gacaca.
Gacaca courts have been framed as local justice, transitional justice, and
reconciliation. Gacaca’s role in the reconciliation process is controversial, but the
Rwandan government additionally pursued other means of reconciliation. The
reconciliation process in Rwanda focused on reconstructing the Rwandan identity, as well
as balancing justice, truth, peace, and security.129 The Constitution now states that every
Rwandan share equal rights with their fellow countrymen. Laws have been passed to
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fight discrimination and divisive genocide ideology. The Rwandan government
established the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) in 1999 and has
contributed substantially to reconciliation efforts in Rwanda. The NURC has organized
many conferences that aim to help people understand the roots of genocide, and how to
proceed with life in the aftermath of genocide. The NURC also organizes conferences to
bring people together to share their grievances. It was in these settings that the
government realized that making education free up till high school and abolishing official
discrimination were crucial steps to take.
It is important to understand what the main aims of transitional justice were.
Some scholars argue that there were six main aims: truth, justice, peace, healing,
forgiveness, and reconciliation.130 The question of the success of transitional justice lies
in how well gacaca courts did on these six counts. Furthermore, gacaca was tasked with
processing the massive backlog of genocide cases, improving living conditions in the
jails, and facilitating economic development. Although, to be clear, the government of
Rwanda did not choose gacaca courts because they felt that it was the most efficient
mechanism to realize their objectives, but because there was a dearth of good options
from which to choose.
The government believed that gacaca would overcome future minor conflicts and
create a sense of unity.131 A lot of the government’s faith in gacaca’s ability to build
peace assumed that there would be future conflicts. The government expected gacaca to
create civic virtues in the population that would not only allow them to deal with the
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conflicts of the past, but also encourage peaceful deliberation in the future. The
population was divided on how to interpret the role of gacaca in the peacebuilding
process. Peace was difficult to discuss when the wounds of the civil war were so fresh,
and when there was such intense and deep rooted animosity. Relations between survivors
and convicted criminals or suspects were often strained. Gacaca suspects often
emphasized that gacaca helped to create negative peace, because they feared that they
would be the victims of violent reprisals when they returned to their communities.132
These suspects believed that without gacaca giving them the opportunity to express
remorse for their crimes and ask for forgiveness, their communities would act against
them. However, research indicates that only a minority of suspects showed remorse for
their crimes or asked for forgiveness.133 Survivors tended to interpret gacaca as
contributing to positive peace, by creating a difficult but necessary dialogue. However,
many members of the community also believed that gacaca exacerbated conflicts within
the community by raising tensions. The NURC surveyed the public about gacaca and the
results showed that most Rwandans expected an initial increase in instability during
hearings. According to this survey, 49 percent of the general population and 74 percent of
survivors believed that gacaca testimonies exacerbated tensions amongst families.134
However, the consensus amongst the population seems to be that, beyond initial
confrontation, gacaca did contribute to positive peace. Arguably, the initial tensions
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added to the peacebuilding process because they directed tensions into engagement at the
courts.
Healing differs from reconciliation in the sense that it refers more to an
individual’s post-genocide trauma than to a communal healing. One way in which gacaca
contributed to healing was by freeing many survivors of certain sources of mental
anguish, such as not knowing what happened to their loved ones during the genocide.
Some survivors also articulated that they felt more whole because they felt more
connected to their community after gacaca. The processes in the gacaca that affected
individuals overlaps with the processes that helped determine the truth after the genocide.
Survivors and suspects often found personal redemption through the truth. Gacaca allows
survivors to use storytelling as a mechanism to reintegrate themselves into their
community.135 They were able to externalize their trauma in front of an empathetic
audience and hear similar stories and overcome feelings of social isolation.
Memorialization is extremely important for survivors because they often did not get to
bury their loved ones. However, not all survivors believed that gacaca contributed to
healing. The same NURC survey as quoted above showed that 91 percent of survivors
believed that gacaca would intensify suffering and trauma.136
Suspects often expressed that they, like survivors, were looking to find peace of
mind from gacaca. Perhaps more so than survivors, suspects express that gacaca is a
necessary step to redeem themselves to reenter society. Those who confessed to
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committing crimes expressed that gacaca acted as a process of redemption and atonement
for them, and those who believe they were innocent only felt at peace when they were
able to refute the allegations made against them in court. Academic commenters and
NGO workers were critical of healing within gacaca as they believed that it did not
contribute to the healing process sufficiently. Many believed that counselling sessions
and workshops were necessary for survivors to work through their trauma, and that the
open-air style of gacaca would aggravate trauma and a feeling of vulnerability and
isolation. Additionally, while gacaca may begin the process of healing, it is a long
process and all participants require ongoing assistance. Many participants believed that it
is the community engagement that gacaca provides that is most valuable in their healing
process.
The concept of forgiveness is a relatively new one in transitional justice, and a
very controversial one. Many critics have argued that including forgiveness in the
discussion surrounding transitional justice pushes transitional justice further from
retributive and deterrent justice.137 They believe that forgiveness entails a contrived
forgetting of crimes on the part of victims and relinquishes the principles of
accountability and redress for victims that are so core to transitional justice. However,
Hannah Arendt has argued that forgiveness is a key process for post atrocity justice
because it is the exact opposite of revenge. She believes that vengeance only fuels the
cycle of violence.138 Forgiveness in transitional justice does not refer to ignoring the
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crimes committed or intending to forget them, but rather, actively acknowledging them.
Forgiveness does not close off the possibility that someone might seek redress. This is
also where forgiveness differs from reconciliation, because while forgiveness suggests
there would be a new relationship between the perpetrator and the survivor, nothing in
the concept of forgiveness suggests that the two parties must reconcile. There are three
main ways to explore forgiveness: what form forgiveness should take; by what processes
it occurs through gacaca; and what motivates survivors to forgive.
Survivors were more hesitant about accepting the concept of forgiveness than
suspects. As explained earlier, many suspects believe gacaca helped them redeem
themselves and atone for their crimes. It was largely the suspects who believe that
forgiveness is possible after the genocide. A minority of survivors agree, but the vast
majority believe that they will never be able to forgive perpetrators. Some survivors agree
that forgiveness is necessary, but believe that it is not a priority, compared with other
concerns such as the truth. Forgiveness as a process is typically separated into categories
of interpersonal, forgetting, and forgiveness from God.139 Interpersonal includes
individual to individual, and individual to group, in which suspects ask their community
for forgiveness. The processes through which forgiveness takes place is typically during
gacaca hearings. The process is a two way interaction which requires the active
involvement of the survivor and the suspect. It involves the suspect confessing,
apologizing and then requesting forgiveness. The survivor decides whether to forgive
them based on the level of remorse and regret expressed. The emphasis on forgiveness
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often simply means survivors accept the contrition of perpetrators and decide not to
pursue any revenge or retribution against them. Academics have pointed out that there
was a lot of discussion
about how survivors have a
right to retribution, based on
the trauma they have
endured.140 Forgiveness
means survivors allow
perpetrators to rejoin their
Credit: Marco Longari/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Figure 16: A Rwandan confronting an inmate in a session for detainees
who were accused of crimes committed during the genocide.

communities. However, like
healing, it is clear that the

process of forgiveness may begin at gacaca, but it is a long process that requires
continued dialogue.
The pursuit of truth in a post-conflict society is often framed as one that sacrifices
the pursuit of justice. Policy makers often must decide between establishing a judicial
institution that tries an individual without full knowledge of the truth, or some form of
truth commission, which involves the promise of amnesty for the full disclosure of the
truth. Scholars typically separate “legal truth” and “therapeutic truth,” when discussing
post-conflict societies because some testimonies are given for a personal or emotional
reason, rather than to achieve a pragmatic objective. Academics also set apart three
processes through which the truth is found: truth telling, truth hearing, and truth
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shaping.141 Truth telling is the process through which participants detail their personal
experiences. Truth hearing is the process by which participants internalize and react to
that truth. Truth shaping is the process by which external parties interpret and repeat the
testimony to achieve a secondary function. Some Rwandan commenters believe that the
truth telling process was critical for people to confront the ethnic hatreds that led to the
genocide. Non-Rwandan commenters usually strongly disagree that the truth telling
process had any merits and argue that the truth telling at gacaca was primarily a ‘topdown’ process, by which the government imposed a series of legal and historical truths
upon an unwilling population to encourage punitiveness against the Hutu; and second,
that public testimony opposes a pervasive Rwandan culture of silence and secrecy and
thus violates embedded social norms.142 Furthermore, while most commenters and
academics agree that gacaca facilitated the pursuit of truth far more than any other
institution could have, there are many flaws with the system. One is that, since there was
such a demand for the truth and such a focus on confessions as a path to forgiveness, a
great deal of suspects confessed to crimes less severe than they committed. Some
communities have organized and abide by a code of silence before the gacaca courts.
Because of this, many survivors believed that truth would not be restored to them by
gacaca. The accused and their families were also distrustful of the gacaca process. They
believed that the testimonies would be used for something other than to serve justice for
the genocide. This was not an unfounded concern. In some communities, genocide
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survivors conspired to fabricate testimony against certain people. This was often
motivated by a desire for revenge, in which they felt sure that certain people were
involved and wanted to make sure they were punished, or to settle financial or land
related disputes. These cases were problematic because they went against Gacaca Law,
but it was very difficult to tell who was lying.143
Gacaca is generally said to have been successful at achieving a fair degree of
justice in the communities affected. This is typically a form of restorative justice. While
gacaca was largely successful in terms of addressing the genocide and the crimes
committed, to the greatest extent that it was able to, Hutus were largely mistreated. There
are three ways in which the gacaca courts failed to deliver justice: no accountability for
RPF crimes, unfair trials, and inhumane treatment in prisons. Gacaca is often viewed as
the victor's justice. The Gacaca Law states that gacaca only has jurisdiction over crimes
related to the genocide, and therefore atrocities committed by the RPF were largely
ignored. Several sources described indiscriminate killings by RPF soldiers, and summary
executions of those suspected to have taken part in the genocide. This violates the
UDHR’s articles 10 and 11, the right to a fair trial and the right to be perceived as
innocent until proven guilty. The RPF carried out tens of thousands of killings, and
mostly without evidence. They believed that they were killing those responsible for the
genocide, but it is clear that most of the Hutus that played a large part in organizing the

143

Article 10 of the 2004 Gacaca Law provides that judges cannot decide cases in which a
“serious enmity” exists with the accused or where “any other relation [is] considered incompatible
with the honest person’s independence.”

90

genocide had already fled by then. The RPF was largely murdering civilians who had
been coerced or forced into the killings.
Gacaca also had several basic violations of the right to a fair trial.144 The UDHR
explains the right to a fair trial in Article 10, “Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair
and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his
rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.”145 Some of the
shortcomings of gacaca in terms of ensuring a fair trial include: limitations on an accused
person's ability to effectively defend themselves; flawed decision-making leading to
allegations of miscarriages of justice; cases based on what appeared to be trumped-up
charges, linked, in some cases, to the government’s wish to silence critics or to settle
disputes between neighbors and even relatives; judges’ or officials’ intimidation of
defense witnesses; corruption of judges to obtain the desired verdict; and other serious
procedural irregularities.146 Gacaca proceedings do not follow these laws and the accused
have no right to counsel at any point through the proceedings. The government has
strongly defended its decision by saying that the number of accused made counsel for all
impossible, lawyers would bias untrained judges and the community-based system was
enough to guarantee a fair trial. However, this was untrue—based on previous paragraphs
which discussed the prevalence of lying in these courts. The government also could have
guaranteed alternative forms of legal assistance to ensure a fair trial. There was
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significant international support for this notion, but the Rwandan government did not act.
Additionally, the fundamental right of innocence until proven guilty was not always
respected during gacaca proceedings.147 Furthermore, the UN Human Rights Committee
states that public bodies should not prejudge outcomes of trials.148 This was largely
ignored by the Rwandan government, that constantly announced names of people they
believed to be guilty over the radio before their trial results were announced. Also,
government officials often used accusations of “revisionism,” “negationism,” and “gross
minimization of genocide,” all of which are proscribed by the Rwandan Constitution and
a 2003 law punishing genocide—as tools to suppress independent opinion and criticism
and pursue political opponents.149 This often occurred in high profile cases, especially
when those involved were government critics. This created an environment that biased
the results of the trial.
Fair trial rights of an accused include the right to be informed of the accusations
against him or her and the right to have sufficient time to prepare a defense.150 In gacaca
cases many of those accused learned the nature of the allegations against them during the
trial. They did not receive the legally prescribed notice or were not given enough
information about the charges pending against them to prepare an adequate defense.
Furthermore, the gacaca jurisdiction must deliver a formal summons to any person asked
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to appear at a trial.151 Human Rights Watch documented many cases in which summonses
were delivered less than seven days before the hearing, which prejudiced the ability of
the accused to prepare a defense.152 Summons were given late, or not delivered at all.
Sometimes, those accused had no idea that they had a case pending against them, and in
other instances they did not know the date of the trial and so were declared guilty by
default. Often, they did not have adequate information about the charges against the
accused and so the accused were not able to prepare a defense. In response to this, the
accused often asked for trials to be postponed so they could gather documents and
prepare their defense and were denied. If a defense was prepared, they were often not
allowed to present one. The right to present a defense is implied in Rwandan law and
exists in international law.153 Witnesses were sometimes intimidated and prevented from
showing up. Gacaca courts also sometimes did not allow the accused to confront or
interact with witnesses that were accusing them of crimes.
The ICCPR guarantees an accused the right “not to be compelled to testify against
himself or to confess guilt.”154 The 2004 Gacaca Law does not guarantee this right, and
its preamble states that all Rwandans have a legal duty to testify.155 Article 29 goes on to
say that “[a]ny person who omits or refuses to testify on what he/she has seen or on what
he/she knows, as well as the one who makes a slanderous denunciation, shall be
prosecuted by the Gacaca Court which makes the statement of it.” In this case, Gacaca
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Law directly conflicts with international law. This is one of the conflicts between truth
and justice. A body only committed to justice would not force participants to testify, but
gacaca must balance the obligations of both. In addition, the UN Human Rights
Committee has emphasized the right to be present at one’s own trial.156 Rwanda allowed
trials in absentia.157 These trials are not necessarily illegal. They are only problematic
within the context that gacaca trials have failed to protect so many other basic human
rights. Many of these trials have been politically motivated and designed to ensure that
the accused are not present and so unable to defend themselves. Furthermore, Rwandan,
and international law guarantees the right not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained.158
Immediately following the genocide, tens of thousands of individuals were arrested on
the basis of unconfirmed accusations and detained for prolonged periods without any
form of due process. By 1998, the prison population reached around 130,000, with
detainees held in life-threatening conditions. This is also inhumane and degrading
treatment, which is illegal under many sources international law.159 Furthermore, gacaca
judges were not trained or qualified, and so their ability to carry out a fair trial vastly
differs from judges in formal legal institutions.
The ability of gacaca to administer justice can largely be assessed based on the
principle of a right to remedy.160 This states that: “Everyone has the right to an effective

156

Human Rights Committee General Comments, art. 14, para. 11,
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/bb722416a295f264c12563ed0049dfbd (accessed August 31,
2010). Article 14: “When exceptionally for justified reasons trials in absentia are held, strict
observance of the rights of the defence is all the more necessary.”
157
Rwandan Code of Criminal Procedure, arts. 155-156.
158
Rwandan Constitution, art. 18; ICCPR, art. 9; ACHPR, art. 5.
159
ICCPR Article 7, 10 and The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
160
UDHR Article 8.

94

remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights
granted him by the constitution or by law.” Gacaca certainly, to a great extent, allowed
Tutsi participants to find justice. Of course, this varied from community to community,
but by in large, Tutsi participants were positively affected by gacaca. The same cannot be
said for Hutu participants. Unfortunately, gacaca was never built to find justice for its
Hutu participants, and so by its own aims, succeeded in providing justice. However, by
an international standard, the gacaca courts largely failed in terms of providing a right to
effective remedy.
Reconciliation was interpreted by the Rwandan population in an individualistic
fashion. The population articulated that reconciliation was about emotional and personal
issues. It was largely face to face interactions, and gacaca facilitated this type of
interaction. Furthermore, the earlier discussion of peace, healing and forgiveness all
contribute to the concept of reconciliation. Personal healing and forgiveness between
individuals contribute to a larger culture of reconciliation in Rwanda. Furthermore,
gacaca punishments largely had the accused working in communities and working
alongside survivors to build trust. This is a long process and could have only been started
by gacaca courts.
The gacaca court system was successful in its pragmatic aims, processing the
massive backlog of genocide cases, improving living conditions in the jails, and
facilitating economic development. In terms of its six objectives of peace, healing,
forgiveness, truth, justice, and reconciliation, gacaca failed to protect several basic rights
along the way. The RPF can be held accountable for the violations of these rights because
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it seemed that they could have been easily protected if it were politically advantageous to
do so. The Gacaca Law mandate should have included crimes committed against the
Hutu population to better facilitate justice and reconciliation. Furthermore, the RPF led
government should have ensured that there were supplementary programs in place to
facilitate healing and justice more effectively.
But even with these shortcomings, the Rwandan government, by so actively
pursuing the justice process, regardless of ulterior motives, in many ways broke the cycle
of the victim/perpetrator. While Hutus should have been treated significantly better after
the genocide, they were largely integrated back into their communities, except for those
facing trial abroad. Had the RPF chosen to take military action against the Hutu, and
follow a campaign of oppression, the legacy that formed would have been the one to
always exist: victim turned perpetrators when politically expedient.
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Conclusion: The Thematic Approach as It Relates to US Mass Shootings
"Memory, stay faithful to this moment, which will never return."
Suji Kwock Kim

Disenfranchisement, Power Threat Theory, Political Elite Influence and “America
As Enemy” in The Context of Mass Shootings
Exploring the historical context of incidences of collective violence may allow us
to prevent similar political crises and violence from breaking out in those regions, but the
frameworks adopted here can also be applied more widely to other forms of collective
violence. Because this approach does not take ethnicity or race to be the primary drivers
of violence, it can be applied to many forms of violence that do not have a clear driver or
do not isolate victims based on a specific identity group. For example, mass shootings in
the US do not on the surface have many similarities to the case studies explored in the
thesis. Mass shootings are not united by an ethnic or racial target, and unlike the case
studies analyzed, are not conducted by a specific group, but rather by an individual acting
on behalf of a group. The discourse around US mass shootings often point to the easy
accessibility to guns as a primary motivator of mass shootings. However, this chapter’s
analysis seeks to explain the cultural issues that lead to mass shootings, although the
mass shooting rate is undoubtedly exacerbated by poor gun control.
The first framework, power/threat theory, applies well to mass shootings in the
political and personal sense. The mass shooters often feel disenfranchised and on the
fringes of society. The Violence Project developed a database of mass shooters and their
life histories through interviews and social media and discovered that a vast majority of
mass shooters experience childhood trauma, mental illness and then reach a crisis
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point.161 The childhood trauma was often a precursor to mental illnesses such as
depression, anxiety, thought disorders or suicidality. Most shooters then reached a clear
crisis point before the shooting – for workplace shooters it was often a change in job
status, and for other shooters it was often personal rejection or change in a relationship
status. These men clearly felt isolated and dejected. Politically, many shooters’
manifestos speak to the “great replacement” or “white genocide” theory. The great
replacement theory was first coined by the French writer Renaud Camus.162 The concern
is that one people would be replaced by another. According to Camus, the identity of the
new group is less important than the process of replacement. This idea of ‘replacement’ is
similar to the power/threat framework: the concern that a marginalized population is
gaining relative to and at the cost of the more powerful group. White mass shooters, like
white Tulsans, worry that their position as part of a hegemonic power structure is under
threat. Mass shooters obviously do not credit Camus with the idea, but his term has taken
on a life of its own in the international white nationalist discourse. Of course, mass
shooters rarely defend their ideas as in terms of a desire that their group maintain its
hegemonic status. They talk about their whiteness as another type of diversity that must
be protected – their racist ideology hidden within language of the progressive left.
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The El Paso shooter’s manifesto disparages both Republicans and Democrats.163
The manifesto attacks Democrats for the growing Hispanic population and for facilitating
the great replacement. The author also worried that automation would limit job
opportunities and believes that immigrants should not be allowed to enter the US while
job opportunities are unstable. He criticizes Republicans for allowing corporate interests
to control the government and worries that corporations are destroying the planet with
their greed. The author clearly feels disenfranchised and voiceless in the political climate
and sees threats on every side.164 Many manifestos contain a similar language: they talk
about ethnic replacement, obsess over white birth rates and a “Hispanic invasion” at the
southern border.165 These manifestos do not say as much about the individual shooters as
they do about the culture that created them. In a climate in which white men feel
disenfranchised and under threat of extinction, violence seems to be the only route by
which to make an impact, and rhetoric from political elites emboldens them.
The ideologies mentioned in these manifestos are not new, but they have become
mainstream ideas rather than a fringe ideology. Trump’s administration has given a
platform to anti-immigrant ideas and created a social and political environment in which
ideas of white nationalism has institutional backing. Trump provides a platform to the
more extreme of the ideas, with comments like “You had some very bad people in that
group. But you also had people that were very fine people, on both sides,” when asked
about the presence of KKK and Nazi symbols in the Charlottesville riots, however, many
Arango, Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, and Katie Benner, “Minutes Before El Paso Killing,
Hate-Filled Manifesto Appears Online,” The New York Times, August 3, 2019, sec. U.S.,
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164 Ibid.
165“Understanding The Statements Of Mass Shooters,” NPR.org, accessed May 10, 2020,
https://www.npr.org/2019/08/07/748972024/understanding-the-statements-of-mass-shooters.
163Tim

99

of these ideas pervade intellectual circles as well.166 Concerns about the future of white
America can be found in the pages of the New York times and in best-selling books.
Charles Murray talks about how the new white ‘lower class’ is increasingly
disenfranchised and disillusioned.167 J.D. Vance explains the resurgence of outsider
politics and the fears of the white underclass in Hillbilly Elegy.168
Even though the shooters seem to act alone, they are very much a part of a
collective. In the 1980s and 1990s, before the internet solidified the movement, labels of
‘lone wolf’ made sense. Now, these far-right movements share ideas, leadership, and
inspirations across new internet platforms.169 The manifestos clearly suggest that they are
playing off each other. The El Paso shooter referenced the New Zealand shooter. The
Poway synagogue shooter drew inspiration from the New Zealand shooter and the
Pittsburgh synagogue shooter.170 A few decades ago, individuals were empowered to act
on their own since there was not a centralized movement – but now, the internet has
created a virtual world that gives the threat of a “transnational, global white-supremacist
terrorist movement” a forum and a community.171 Beyond the community, these shooters
seek notoriety and build on each other’s actions. Each shooter seems to want to outdo the
last. Christopher Picciolini, a reformed white nationalist who now works to de-radicalize
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extremists, explains that not only are they trying to outdo each other, but they are also
trying to outdo Timothy McVeigh.172 The Sandy Hook shooter had studied the
Columbine massacre and many others. The shooter who killed 50 at the Pulse Nightclub
in Orlando, Florida had studied a previous attack in San Bernardino, California – both
shooters cited radical Islam as a justification. Psychologists argue that mass shooters
often see themselves as a part of a brotherhood of resentful and isolated young men and
previous terrorists are often idols.173 The Columbine massacre, especially, acts as a
blueprint for mass shooters.174 It created an entire subculture of violent people infatuated
with Columbine and shooters using it as a blueprint for their mass murder plans.175
The other collective at play is civilians and their collective sense of security. Mass
shootings are terrorism, and terrorism relies on theater as a way of inciting fear.
Terrorism hopes to create political change by creating an atmosphere of fear rather than
causing material damage. Terrorists have neither military ability nor power but hope to
affect the balance of power. As impossible of a mission as it seems, it is often successful,
especially in the mass shooting context. By affecting civilians’ sense of collective
security, mass shootings erode American democracy. Terrorism targets public spaces.
Mass shooters target malls, concerts, food festivals, bars, schools, and cinemas. By doing
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this, they destroy civilians’ sense of safety in public spaces and communal gatherings.
Fundamental common experiences such as eating, socializing, or learning become
experiences of panic and death.176 When shootings take place at community events or
within a neighborhood, they erode the sense of home. A democratic society does not
function well with increased surveillance and security, and without spontaneous
socialization and public gatherings.
Current Narratives as They Contribute to Legacy Formation
Ensuring coverage of terrorism is a key part of the terrorist strategy because it
allows them to broadcast terror far beyond their immediate victims. It is a mutually
beneficial relationship; the media need drama and visuals and the terrorists need a
platform. It is journalistically routine to name mass killers and often important in order to
apprehend them. But once they are captured, many organizations argue that their
identities should not be sensationalized. Since some attackers are motivated by a desire
for notoriety, campaigns like “Don’t Name Them”177 and “No Notoriety”178 push media
outlets to avoid naming terrorists. These strategies are endorsed by the FBI, who argue
that mass shootings have a contagion effect.179 If the news cycle continues to immortalize
mass shooters, the cycle of young isolated men idolizing them continues. By making sure
these terrorists will not be famous, the media removes a powerful incentive. These
campaigns also seek to focus coverage on victims and heroes. This makes sense as a
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journalistic practice, but also from a historical lens. An important part of this thesis is the
argument that historical memories should make sure victims of violence are not as
marginalized historically as they were in their lifetimes. The current narratives
surrounding mass shootings will create a legacy - the same way the coverage of the
Columbine shooter created a legacy. Unlike the historical case studies in this thesis, mass
shootings are an ongoing crisis. They are also motivated by historical myths and ideas
that their identities are under threat, but rather than focusing on proper memorialization,
we have an opportunity to change the course of the legacy of mass shootings to prevent
current violence.
Racism, race-based islamophobia, and anti-immigrant sentiment is often a
primary part of mass shooter’s manifestos. But while these are foundational factors, we
cannot assume that they are the main motivators. Many Americans harbor similar
thoughts, and yet only a minority resort to violence. The same logic applies with gun
control. While gun control would undoubtedly limit violence, it would not end it.
Terrorists committed to violence find a way to carry out violence. Mass shooters are a
group of isolated and angry young men who have no outlet for their frustrations beyond
violence. Many factors play a role in this, from ethnic hatred and racism to mental illness
and from political elites’ rhetoric to popular polarization in the US, but many of these
factors coalesce into a larger feeling of being at threat.

Overlooked Themes
An important part of making sure that current narratives do not feed into future
violence is making sure that these narratives do not overlook key factors. Out of the 171
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mass shootings in the US since 1966, 3 have been conducted by women. Many of the
men are described with similar language: isolated, troubled, angry.180 There is no
significant analysis of gender in the discourse of mass shootings. Democrats obsess over
gun control, and Republicans obsess over mental health – but no one seems to focus on
the third glaring commonality in mass shooters. Even the Violence Project, that analyzes
a database of 171 mass shooters and discovers four commonalities, ignores gender as a
factor. The four commonalities are childhood trauma, a crisis point, a script and access.181
While mass shooters clearly feel threatened in terms of political disenfranchisement, it is
important to note that their masculinity is often also at threat. Eric Madfis coined the term
“triple privilege” to describe how mass shooters often share elements of white
entitlement, toxic heterosexual masculinity and anxieties about middle-class instability.182
All three of these identities concern privilege, and fit well into the power/threat
framework because they are not at threat in absolute terms but other groups are relatively
gaining. Madfis also argues that societal pressures lead to women internalizing anger
while men are taught to externalize it through acts of aggression.
Masculinity plays a key role in violence. This thesis overlooked questions of
gender in specific cases of violence for the sake of brevity, but it is important to have a
gendered understanding of violence. Women are often relegated to the sides during
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studies of violence, or simply acknowledged as victims of sexual violence. But women
cannot be pushed into the category of victims as men are acknowledged as fighters and
politicians. Gender is also important to acknowledge because masculinity is often a
crucial motivator of violence. Militarization often relies on men believing that they are
defending their manhood.183 Their masculinity becomes dependent on their performance
as soldiers. Curiosity is an important part of this scholarship – soldiering and military
activity is often discussed as a naturally manly activity, but, in fact, it takes significant
mental energy to engage in the activity of constructing it as masculine. These persuasive
strategies are explicit and often backed by coercion. In most wars, the government
embarks on an intentional strategy to create gender roles. Huge marketing budgets are
allocated to create a narrative of shaming men who do not want to be soldiers, and
convincing women it is their maternal duty to support the men from home. Sexual
violence often gets constructed as inevitable when it is also often a very intentional
strategy by which to bring masculinity into play for militiamen.
Christopher Browning examines the role of comradeship and group dynamics in
violence and how group pressures led men to kill defenseless Jewish people.184 These ties
of comradeship were heavily masculinized. The concern was that their fellow men would
stop thinking that they were ‘tough.’ Nationalist propaganda was not enough to transform
these men into killers, and neither was a culture of masculinity alone. It was an intensely
purposeful strategy of building relationships infused with ideas of masculinity and tying
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these men’s ability to kill to the respect of their peers. Lee Ann Fuji examines how group
ties convinced more Hutu to join killing bands on a local level because it was more
difficult to defy the group than follow along. A lot of this was likely influenced by ethnic
ties, and concerns over betraying their fellow Hutu, but how much of it became a
question of toughness and masculinity?185 During anti-Jewish pogroms, Nazis were often
convinced to stop pogroms by Jewish women who gave them “soap and coffee” and then
were “put to work.”186 In the Punjab massacres at the time of the Partition, tales of Hindu
women being violated by Muslim men were a powerful motivator in pushing Hindu men
to violence.187 For Hindu men, their role was masculinized as they were cast as protectors
of their religion while Hindu women were simultaneously not only cast as victims, but
the weak link.
Gender thus plays a significant role in questions of ethnic nationalism.
Nationalism allows women to find a place in the public sphere, but nationalism also casts
them as symbols of a violated nation. Clear from the example of Hindu women, ethnic
nationalism often casts women as patriarchally constructed symbols. Women are rarely
real participants of nationalist movements, partly because nationalism is a movement
based on the idea of belonging, which automatically creates an insider/outsider dynamic.
Nationalist movements are also typically conceived from masculinized memory.188
Women are rarely looked on to understand the history of a colonized people, even though
they experience multi-layered oppression.
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Theology plays an important role in issues of collective violence as well.
Violence, especially terrorist violence, requires a great deal of internal conviction and
some legitimization from a respected authority. Often, this authority comes from political
elites. But sometimes individuals look to God and theology for justifications for their
violence. All religions have been used to justify violence in some ways and individuals
are able to find theological justifications for their causes. In the case of Timothy
McVeigh, he sought revenge against what he thought to be a tyrannical government.
McVeigh saw around himself a world at war, and believed Christians have a moral duty
to reassert the dominion of God over all things. This is another way in which religious
terrorism is collective violence rather than an individual acting on their own. McVeigh
saw himself as a soldier in a holy cosmic war.189 He was simply making one move in a
larger Christian war against a secular and tyrannical state. Islamic theological
justifications operate along similar lines. It is a question of a cosmic fight against
apostasy – and so one must use any means necessary.190 With theological justifications,
the argument depends on the idea that the religion or group is under threat. With Islamic
justifications, the threat is often Western cultural imperialism. Like Timothy McVeigh
and many mass shooters, some terrorists with Islamic theological justifications employ an
ideology of “America as enemy.”191 More than any other country, the US is often
villainized as a foe. For domestic terrorists, this often means they target symbols of
American culture or society – a culture and society they perceive to have manipulated the

189Mark

Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 36.
190Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, 82.
191Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God 181.

107

history of their region. Terrorists from abroad often see the US’s economic and political
reach as an agent of colonialism, and so see their violence as a mechanism of selfdefense.
Discussions of theology as it relates to collective violence also require a gendered
lens. Movements that resort to religious terrorism tend to empower marginal men to carry
out violence. The men are typically part of socially/economically unstable groups that
need a sense of purpose. Men, more so than women, gain a sense of purpose and identity
through their public personas and so fears of impending marginality generate more
anxity. Right wing religious movements often also rely on a crisis of sexuality to
motivate young men. Women’s liberty is seen as a threat to honor, a question of “sex out
of place,” and a loss of control.192

Future Study
This thesis aimed to understand why civilians would take up arms against their
friends and neighbors, and why violence of this nature seems to constantly repeat itself. It
came from questions surrounding the ethics of remembrance and memorialization. It is
not a complete analysis of the complex and nuanced motivators at play in moments of
crisis and statelessness. Ideally, this analysis would include more theory on nationalism
and colonialism and analyze theoretical frameworks of collective violence alongside
questions of nationalism and colonialism, with a feminist lens. Further study on this topic
would not only require a broader lens in terms of theory, but also a narrower lens for the
case studies.
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Ethnic violence and racial violence follow very different scripts, and to fully
understand one, it needs to be explored in depth without the other. Furthermore, each
case study would need a far more in depth analysis of geographic and spatial factors.
Each case study mentioned in this chapter spans a geographic landscape, and three of
them are moments of collective violence made up of many individual outbreaks of
violence. The spatial dynamics at play in the urban landscape of Tulsa are different than
the spatial dynamics of rural Rwanda. Perhaps the urban landscape motivated people
towards vandalism and away from murder, whereas the rural Rwandan landscape did the
opposite. There are also many questions that can only be answered by examining the
minutiae of specific massacres. The Lviv pogrom was different than the Boryslav one,
the Calcutta killings different from the Noakhali massacres.
In many ways, this thesis tries to step away from a bird’s eye view of violence to
better understand the dynamics at play. In some ways, it falls into a similar trap. Without
examining specific and localized causes for violence and local politics as they affected
group dynamics, it is not possible to fully explain how civilians were motivated towards
violence. But in many other ways, it succeeds in its aim with its scope. Historical writing
that presupposes events as inevitabilities misses how processes are intentionally
constructed to marginalize and victimize certain people. Questions of inevitability often
amount to lazy storytelling, allowing global systems like patriarchy or colonialism to
become fixed, rather than acknowledging that they continuously evolve and modernize to
adapt to oppress the same groups. Our remembrance affects whether these groups will
continue to be marginalized, or not.
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“What is a child?
A quiet between two bombardments.”
“Deaf Republic” by Ilya Kaminsky

“History is not the same thing as memory. Memory is the way we put history to rest,
especially histories of suffering, trauma and victimization.”
Achilles Joseph Mbembe
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